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Improving economic welfare requires that society’s scarce savings be allocated among
proposed real investment projects in a way that appreciates the prospects of promising new
innovations. Corporate and securities law help structure important elements of this process of
allocation. This article sketches out an approach based upon a seemingly paradoxical analogy of a
market economy’s overall finance process to the way a hierarchical organization gathers and
processes relevant bits of information dispersed among many individuals in order to make
decisions. It thereby takes advantage of important thinking in communications and organizational
theory about how to make organizations sensitive to the potentialities of new information and
ideas.
The analysis suggests that established firms should pay out a relatively high portion of their
cash flows. There should be a substantial venture capital sector and an active market for IPOs.
Primary and secondary market prices should be relatively accurate. Incumbent managers of
established firms should be judged in part by the medium term share price performance of their
firms and poor performers should be under threat of replacement.
A comparison of four moments in economic history—the United States in the 1970s and
1980s, Japan since 1995, continental Europe since the 1995, and the United States since the
1995—supports these conclusions. The United States since 1995, relative to the other three
moments in economic history, has had the least capital deepening and the fastest rate of growth in
productivity per hour worked. It has also had, relative to the other three moments, a finance
system most closely resembling what is called for here.
Achieving such a system requires rigorous, effectively enforced securities disclosure and
anti-fraud laws. Corporate law must leave poorly performing incumbent management vulnerable
to removal by hostile tender offer, or shareholder or independent board vote. Share price based
compensation must be legally practical. And there must be serious constraints on non-pro-rata
distribution among shareholders of the wealth created by the firm.
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Innovation is critical to improving a society’s economic welfare. In the 
highly developed economies of North America, Western Europe and Japan, 
increases in the stock of physical capital and the exploitation of natural resources 
are no longer the primary sources of annual gains in per capita GDP. In the 43 
year period from 1949 to 1992, for example, only a quarter of the tripling in 
manufacturing output per hour worked in the United States was attributable to 
capital deepening.1 The rest of these gains came from other sources, the most 
important appearing to be improved products and processes.2  
Law, and public policy more generally, can help promote innovation in a 
variety of ways. The appropriate level of protection for intellectual property and 
the funding of education and basic research are examples of ways that have 
received considerable attention. The focus of this article, however, is the impact 
on innovation of the securities and corporate law relating to publicly traded 
corporations. While economic analysis has dominated U.S. corporate and 
securities scholarship in recent decades, static efficiency has been the primary 
concern. The promotion of welfare enhancing innovation—dynamic efficiency—
has attracted little study.    
This dearth of research is not surprising. At first glance, corporate and 
securities laws applicable to public corporations appear to have little to do with 
innovation. Further examination, though, suggests that they play a much larger 
role. In a capitalist economy, the decisions that determine which proposed real 
investment projects are, and are not, implemented are made within firms and in 
the larger financial markets in which these firms operate.3 Corporate and 
                                                          
1 Calculations based on figures in William Gullickson, Measurement of Productivity Growth in 
US Manufacturing, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 23 (July 1995) 
2 For early work showing that capital accumulation does not explain most of the huge growth that 
occurred in output per capita in the 20th century, see Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the 
Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 316 (1957) (from 1909-1949 in the 
United States, the increase in capital accounts for only about 1/8 of the total increase in output per 
man hour over the period, suggesting, arguably, that technical change was arguably responsible for 
the remaining 7/8ths); EDWARD F. DENISON, WHY GROWTH RATES DIFFER 318 (1967) (from 
1950-1962, advances in knowledge was the most important source of economic growth for the 
United States and at least five of the eight western European countries surveyed). Easterly and 
Levine’s more recent survey article of the larger growth accounting literature concludes that 
something other than physical or human capital accumulation explains the bulk of cross country 
differences in the growth of per capita income and that “technology is a formidable force” in 
determining this residual determinant of growth. William Easterly & Ross Levine, It’s Not Factor 
Accumulation: Stylized Facts and Growth Models, 15 THE WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 177, 192, 
211 (2001). 
3 The importance of outside finance for project choice in an economy has been recognized for a 
long time, and has continued to be a focus of research. See, e.g. JOSHPH A. SCHUMPTER, THEORY 
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1911); JOHH R. HICKS, A THEORY OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 143-145 
(1969) (emphasizing the liquidity provided by financial markets as critical to early industrial 
development in England, France and Holland); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial 
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securities laws help shape the ways these decisions are made. From a social point 
of view, the ultimate goal for these systems of corporate governance and finance 
should be that they work in such a way that scarce savings are matched with the 
most promising investment project proposals in the economy. To the extent cost 
effective, every knowable bit of information that is relevant to predicting the 
future cash flows associated with each proposed investment project in the 
economy should be gathered and analyzed. The projects should then be ranked in 
terms of their risk adjusted expected returns. The ones chosen to be implemented 
should be selected in rank order of these returns, going down the list until the 
available savings in the economy are exhausted.4  
Making the best choices and promoting innovation are closely related. 
Unless an investment project proposal is innovation-based, it is unlikely to be 
highly promising. Non-innovation-based project proposals—ones in well-
established products or services produced by a well-established technology—are 
unlikely to have above normal expected returns because they have been obvious 
for some time. Any potential above normal returns have usually been competed 
away already by other firms making similar investments. Such investments cannot 
contribute significantly to growth beyond providing a little more capital 
deepening in an already capital rich economy. In contrast, projects with unusually 
high returns are very likely to be innovation-based. These are the ones that can 
contribute to growth. In the standard language of financial economics, these are 
                                                                                                                                                              
Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV.. 559 (1998) (cross country study showing 
relationship between financial market development and rate of growth of firms relying on external 
finance and relationship of such development and flourishing of smaller high technology firms); 
Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
(2005). For a skeptical view, see JOAN ROBINSON, THE RATE OF INTEREST AND OTHER ESSAYS 
(1952) (finance follows industry). 
4 To illustrate, suppose that an economy has in total $30 million to allocate and there are five 
proposed projects, each of which will cost $10 million. Each will pay back for certain the amount 
listed below in one year and nothing thereafter.  
$30 million to Allocate  
Five Proposed Projects Costing $10 Million Each 
 Project    Payback for certain in One Year 
  A       $15 million 
  B       $14 million 
          C       $13 million 
 D                 $12 million 
  E       $11 million 
Choices must be made because only three of the five projects can be funded. Economic welfare is 
maximized if Projects A, B and C were the ones to be implemented. It would be poorly served if 
instead, for example, Project E was implemented and Project A was not. 
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the positive net present value (NPV) projects, and firms that can find and 
implement them are the economy’s “growth” firms. 
Answering the question of how law, through its influence on the behavior 
of a variety of actors – investment project proponents, persons working in 
established firms and in financial intermediaries, and individual investors – can 
make the overall system more sensitive to the potential of promising innovation-
based investment project proposals is a very large project. This Article represents 
a preliminary first step in this project, in essence a sketch of how to think about 
the problem. 
Part I of this article lays out the basic institutional realities: who are the 
likely proponents of promising innovation-based project proposals and who 
decides whether ther proposals are implemented or not.   
Parts II, III and IV address the question of how real investment decisions 
are made in the economy. Developments over the last few decades in the fields of 
the economics of contracts and organization and corporate finance have enhanced 
our understanding of many of the parts of the system making these decisions. The 
discussion here builds on this progress, but steps back and takes a very abstract 
look at the system as a whole, viewing it as a large organization that utilizes 
disparate bits of information held by many different participants to make its 
decisions. This organization, while far more complex than a single hierarchical 
organization, shares some important features with its simpler counterpart. The 
organizational analogy highlights important differences between a market-based 
system for making real investment decisions that have uncertain outcomes and 
one for allocating scarce resources purely for current production and 
consumption.  Communications theory sheds much light on the behavior of 
hierarchical organizations. The analysis in these parts of the paper uses 
communications theory instead to analyze the organization that makes real 
investment decisions in a market economy and to suggest the features of the 
finance process – the system in an economy that links savings to real investment – 
that would make it relatively more or less sensitive to the potentialities of 
innovative proposals.  
Part V applies these lessons to institutional realities addressed in Part I. It 
suggests certain characteristics that in combination would make an economy’s 
finance process more sensitive to innovative ideas: an active market for corporate 
control, relatively high payouts of the cash flows of established corporations to 
their investors, a substantial venture capital sector, an active market for IPOs, a 
high level of corporate transparency, and relatively accurate primary and 
secondary share prices.  
Part VI presents some crude empiricism. It uses the story from Part V to 
help explain four moments in economic history: the United States in the 1970s 
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and 1980s, Japan since the mid 1990s, continental Europe since the mid 1990s, 
and the United States since the mid 1990s.  
Finally, Part VII looks at the role of securities and of corporate law in 
promoting these innovation sensitive characteristics of the finance process.  
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL REALITY 
The employees of large, established corporations are a rich source of innovative 
project proposals because the physical and organizational assets of these 
corporations facilitate the discoveries that give rise to ideas for new products and 
processes.5 These employee proponents of innovative projects are likely to go first 
to top management to try to persuade them to implement the proposal.6 Many 
highly promising proposals made by a corporation’s employees are accepted. 
Both theory and experience tell us that the top managers of established 
corporations also often reject many such proposals. Such a rejection often 
represents a failure of the firm’s internal capital market.7  
As a consequence, we witness, particularly in the United States, the spin-
off phenomenon: an employee or a group of employees of an established 
corporation leave to establish a new business based on an idea developed while in 
their previous employment. Many of the most important innovation-based firms 
in the U.S. economy have grown out of these spin-offs.8 If these spin-offs had not 
occurred, the promising project proposals that formed the bases of these firms 
would have gone to waste. Scarce savings would instead have gone to less 
promising projects and there would have been less economic growth.   
It is in society’s interest, to the extent cost effective, to minimize the 
number of promising innovative project proposals developed by employees of 
established corporations that go to waste. Such waste will occur if the proposal is 
neither implemented by the established corporation employing the proponent nor 
becomes the basis of a spin-off that receives funding from some other source. The 
goal of minimizing the waste of promising innovative project proposals poses a 
                                                          
5 Thomas Hellmann & Enrico Perotti, The Circulation of Ideas in Firms and Markets (2006) 
Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/RICAFE/pdf/RICAFE2-WP30-Hellmann.pdf. 
6 Mariagiovanna Baccara & Ronny Razin, Governance and Innovation; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, 
ROBERT LITAN & CARL J. SCHRAMM, GOOD CAPITALISM, BAD CAPITALISM 82 (2007). 
7 Gilson and Bankman suggest an alternative explanation for some spin-offs. They suggest that 
often the high-powered incentives offered a proponent in the context of a venture-capital-financed 
spinoff are more attractive than what the established firm offers because such high powered 
incentives undermine the team effort for successful R&D. Ronald Gilson & Joseph Bankman, Why 
Start-ups?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 289 (1999). 
8 See, e.g., Amar Bhide, How Entrepreneurs Craft Strategies that Work, 72 HARV. BUS. REV. 150, 
151 (1994) (discussing how a large percentage of the founders of the fastest growing companies 
“replicated or modified an idea encountered through previous employment”). 
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critical challenge for an economy’s system of finance. One component of this 
challenge is to shape the environment in which established corporations operate 
so that they have decision processes that decision makers pass up as few 
promising innovative project proposals as possible. Ultimately, however, there are 
limits to how much large established corporations can be improved in their 
capacity to identify and act on innovative proposals. Thus a second component is 
the facilitation of an effective spin-off phenomenon so that proponents of project 
proposals rejected by established corporations have other possible sources of 
funding—sources with the capacity to recognize which proposals are promising. 
The existence of these other sources of funding also facilitates implementation of 
the many promising innovative project proposals that originate from university-
based and independent proponents. 
II. STEPPING BACK 
How can we best describe conceptually the financial system of a modern capitalist 
economy? Despite being market-based, the system shares important 
characteristics in common with a hierarchical organization. This proposition may 
seem surprising because we tend to think of markets and hierarchical 
organizations as sharply distinct substitutes for each other. Where the question is 
how to allocate scarce resources efficiently for current production and 
consumption, a market and a hierarchical organization do in fact use distinctly 
different mechanisms for dealing with widely dispersed information. But where 
the allocation problem includes choices among proposed investment projects with 
uncertain future returns, the mechanisms used by the two systems involve greater 
overlap. This overlap allows us to make use of thinking regarding what makes 
organizations more innovative, and in so doing provides guidance concerning 
ways to structure the finance process to promote innovation.  
A. Contrasting Market and Hierarchal Allocation Systems for Current Production  
and Consumption 
The sharp contrast between market and hierarchical allocation systems with 
regard to current production and consumption can be considered in the context of 
a highly simplified World A.  In World A, there exist no investment opportunities 
and all of the economy's fixed quantities of its two factors of production available 
in given period—labor and land—are devoted to the production of two outputs—
apples and nuts—for consumption entirely during that period. The market will 
decide the total production of each output, the amount of labor and land that will 
be devoted to each, the method of production for each, and the allocation of each 
output among the individuals in society. These decisions will be determined by 
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the initial distribution of labor and land among individuals, the utility function of 
each individual, and the production function for each output. Other than the input 
and output prices and the reasonably self-evident qualities of each product that 
consumers easily learn from life experience, no participant in this decision 
process needs any information from anyone else. The individual looks only at his 
utility function and how much labor and land he owns. The producer looks only at 
the production function. World A is the quintessential example of the virtues of 
the market economy in eliminating the need for communication among 
participants. And if the appropriate conditions are met, the market’s solution will 
be Pareto optimal.9 
Alternatively, these decisions—what combinations of land and labor to 
use to manufacture apples and what combination to manufacture nuts; how many 
apples and how many nuts to produce; how many of each should go to each 
consumer—could be decided by a large hierarchical organization through central 
planning. In order to come up with a Pareto efficient solution, information would 
need to be gathered about the amount of land and labor available, the range of 
technologies available for producing each output, and the tastes of each consumer 
in terms of the rate at which they would trade off nuts for apples for each given 
possible allocation of nuts and apples that the consumer might receive. This 
would be far too much information for one person to gather and process, and so 
the information would need to be gathered by many individuals at the front line, 
processed and summarized up through a number of layers of intermediate level 
officials and finally presented to a top person or body in the form of a discrete 
number of proposed choices with summarized descriptions of the consequences of 
each.  
Avoiding central planning’s huge cost of information handling, and its 
inevitable errors from information failures, has long been heralded as the market’s 
great advantage.10 The story is familiar. Without any of the communication 
involved in the hierarchical organization solution, an initial set of prices would 
develop. People would see advantages in deciding to purchase various amounts of 
labor and land in order to produce various amounts of apples and nuts in 
particular ways. Individual consumers would decide how much of each to 
purchase from what was produced. These initial decisions will affect the 
prevailing prices for land and labor and for apples and nuts that in turn would lead 
to changes in these decisions and so on until prices reach an equilibrium, 
                                                          
9 World A is the world described in Francis Bator’s famous article showing the conditions under 
which a market economy can solve economics’ basic “how”, “what” and “for whom” questions in 
a pareto optimal way. Francis M. Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 47 AM. 
ECON. REV. 22 (1957). 
10 Freidrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
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reflecting, under appropriate conditions, a Pareto efficient solution to the 
economy’s “how,” “what” and “for whom” questions. 
B. Using Market Allocation Systems for Real Investments 
The market allocation system with regard to real investment is fundamentally 
different. To see this, consider the highly simplified World B, where there are 
only investment opportunities, no current consumption. A single productive 
resource, land, must be allocated between two different kinds of real investment 
opportunities, X and Y, which, in different ways with not yet fully understood 
results, will produce a single output, nuts. Consider how a market would solve 
this problem. As in World A, the endowment of land is arbitrarily allocated 
among investors. Project choice in the economy, i.e., how much in aggregate is 
invested in each of X and Y, is determined by these investors. By assuming that 
each unit of land invested in X or Y represents a separate project, we can abstract 
away the problem of collecting savings from more than one individual for a single 
project. The projects require no management. The supply of each of the two types 
of real investment opportunities is, as in the real world, infinitely elastic. The sole 
result of an investor investing in an X or Y project is his receiving a return in nuts 
in period t + 1, which the investor will then consume. The returns on each kind of 
project are uncertain in period t. In t + 1, all X projects will turn out to have an 
identical return and all Y projects will also have an identical return. The return on 
the X projects will probably be different from the return on the Y projects, 
however. Information useful for predicting the returns from each of the projects is 
dispersed among many individuals, each of whom knows some bits of 
information that not all other individuals know.  
C. Contrasting Allocation for Current Production and Consumption with 
Allocation for Real Investment  
Using, in each case, a market system of allocation, one can contrast what is 
required for an individual to maximize her utility in World A and World B. In 
World A, beyond knowing the market prices of the inputs and the outputs, all the 
consumer needs to do is to look inside herself at her utility function. In World B, 
her views of the characteristics of any given possible portfolio require her to look 
outside and are based on information that she collects concerning the potential 
returns of X and Y in t+1. The expected return and risk characteristics of X and Y 
are not known to her through experience the way the characteristics of apples and 
nuts are. Thus, the economy's aggregate decisions concerning the amount of 
resources invested in X and Y is determined by the information each investor 
possesses. 
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A comparison of Worlds A and B illustrates a tremendously important 
point. In a world where there is real investment, each individual, in order to 
decide where her available resources should be invested, must look outside of 
herself to acquire information. Real investment opportunities are not scarce 
commodities that are in the first instance competitively priced. The cost of 
implementing an investment opportunity is the cost of the needed real resources. 
The prices of these real resources are ordinarily not closely related to the 
opportunity's prospects. 
This need to look outside for information not contained in prices can help 
explain many institutions existing in the real world. Consider World B', which 
includes investment advisers and financial intermediaries. It is reasonable to 
assume that, absent the need to decide the placement of her savings, the average 
investor would not in the ordinary course acquire very much information about 
the prospects of X and Y. And, for the standard reasons, described briefly below, 
it is also reasonable to assume that the market in which she can acquire such 
information on a piece by piece basis falls far short of perfection. To solve the 
problem of her ignorance, the investor, in essence, “hires” persons more 
knowledgeable than she is. This more knowledgeable person may be an 
investment adviser hired to give advice, or he may be the agent of a financial 
intermediary in which the investor invests, who in essence makes decisions on the 
investor’s behalf.  
The intermediary in which the individual invests might itself himself not 
possess much information about the prospects of X or Y, but might know more 
than the individual investor concerning who would have such information. And so 
the process of delegation might repeat itself one or more times. Thus, the investor 
might invest in a financial intermediary (for example, a venture capital firm or 
mutual fund), the intermediary in a corporation, and the corporation would then 
invest the funds it receives in an X or Y project. The special knowledge of the 
investment company might be in selecting the corporation with the most expertise 
in choosing among real investment projects.11 In addition, the investor, the 
financial intermediary and the corporation might each seek outside advice as well 
to make their decisions. 
The position of the investor in relation to the network of persons she 
directly or indirectly “hires” is analogous to the head of a hierarchical 
                                                          
11 Corporations are normally seen to exist for two reasons. First, the amount of capital needed for 
the minimum efficient scale of many projects is too large for a single individual to provide, and 
the corporation is a legal form that enables the proponent of such a project to gather this necessary 
amount from many different individuals. Second, once the investment has been made, the project 
must be managed for it to produce a return. World B' presents neither of these problems. It 
illustrates that corporations have yet a third function, as expert intermediaries in the process of 
project choice. 
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organization. How much of the investor's savings is ultimately invested in X and 
how much in Y is equivalent to a decision of this organization. Because the head 
of a large hierarchical organization cannot accumulate and analyze all the 
information necessary for her to make sensibly all of the organization's decisions, 
much of her work consists of delegating to others who have accumulated more 
information in particular areas and the authority to make decisions on the 
organization's behalf. The average investor is in the same position when faced 
with real investment decisions. Each member of the investor's network, like each 
subordinate member of an organization, is a decision maker in the sense that his 
actions to some extent influence the outcome of the whole process. But the 
investor, like the head of an organization being ultimately responsible for its 
decisions, is ultimately responsible for the decision as to which real investments 
her savings go to because her choices dictate the structure of the rest of the 
process. Thus relying on the market to allocate resources for investment, unlike 
relying on it to allocate resources for current production and consumption, 
involves mechanisms which in some important respects have an organizational 
character.  
D. Introducing Ongoing Firms and Reinvestment  
Worlds B and B' not only abstract out production decisions – decisions as to how 
existing productive capacity is to be used – but they abstract out firm 
reinvestment as well. In the real world, firms also often reinvest the returns 
generated by existing projects in new projects rather than paying out these returns 
to investors. The role of the finance process also includes control reassignment, 
the choice of who over time makes these decisions of whether and where to 
reinvest.12   
                                                          
12 In the real world, control reassignment also comes into play as an antidote to management not 
making optimal production decisions in the use of the firm’s existing facilities. This paper 
abstracts out production decisions for two reasons. First, the focus of the paper is on project choice 
and its influence on the level of innovation in an economy. Second, as will be discussed in Part 
III.E infra, most agency costs of management arise in connection with their project choice 
decisions, not their production decisions. Nevertheless, a more fine-grained analysis will require 
some attention to control reassignment because of managerial production decision deficiencies. As 
will be discussed in Part III.C infra, innovative project proposals are normally a package of an 
investment idea and a plan for the proposal’s proponent to manage the project. Such proponents 
usually do not have proven production decision skills. Ongoing monitoring of the production 
decisions of the proponent and control reassignment where the proponent falls short is thus an 
important function of the funding source for this kind of project, whether the funding source 
decision makers are the principals of a venture capital firm or the top managers of an established 
corporation. The funding source is unlikely to provide the financing without the right to perform 
this function. 
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To incorporate the reinvestment decision aspect of reality, consider World 
C. World C is like World B with the following modifications. In World C, there is 
still no consumption until period t + 1, but there are two earlier periods, t and t - 1. 
There is investment of the single productive input, land, in both these earlier 
periods. In period t-1, each individual investor starts with an arbitrarily assigned 
amount of land. All the land in the economy must be allocated between two 
different kinds of real investment opportunities, U and V, which will produce a 
single output, also land, through a transformation over time in different, not yet 
fully understood, ways. Again each unit of land invested in U or V project 
represents a separate project and the supply of each of the two types of real 
investment opportunities is infinitely elastic. The sole result of an investment in a 
U or V project is a return in land in period t. All U projects will turn out to have 
an identical return in t and all V projects will also have an identical return in t that 
is probably different than that of the U projects. In period t - 1, these returns will 
be uncertain.  
In t - 1, individual investors do not invest directly in projects; they invest 
in firms. An investment in a firm consists of one unit of land and each firm 
decides whether to invest the unit of land it receives from its shareholder in a U or 
a V project. To the individual investors, all the firms appear the same in t - 1, but 
in fact they are not. Each firm has its own special skills at making investment 
project choices, which involve gathering information and making a decision. 
Some firms will be more skilled than others.  Investments in period t - 1 yield 
their return in period t, which, absent shareholder intervention, will then be 
reinvested by management, who will use their skills to make a fresh choice in 
either an X or a Y project that will pay its returns in nuts in t + 1.  
The share obtained by the individual investor in a firm in t -1 includes the 
right in t to change management of the company to one that would pay out the 
returns instead of exercising its choice skills again and reinvesting. To aid in 
deciding whether to exercise this right, investors in period t are able to obtain 
some information concerning the choice skills of each firm. This information 
would consist of the return on the project choice made by the firm in period t - 1 
(which, by itself, is a signal concerning the skills of the firm, but a noisy one), the 
firm’s announced rationale for the choice made in t - 1, and information about the 
world that would permit an evaluation of the soundness of the announced 
rationale.  
In period t, each investor must initially decide whether to change the 
management of any of the firms in which she invested in period t -1, in which 
case she would receive the return in the form of land on the investment made by 
the firm in t - 1 in a U or V project. She then must decide what to do with any 
units of land so received. She has three choices: (1) invest directly in X or Y 
projects, which will return nuts for consumption in period t + 1, (2) with the 
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intention not to exercise the option to change management, purchase from other 
investors shares of firms that invested in U or V projects in t - 1, in which case 
she will receive a return in the form of nuts for consumption in t + 1 arising from 
the investment the purchased firm makes in period t in an X or Y project, or (3) 
with the intention to exercise the option to change management, purchase from 
other investors shares of firms that invested in U or V projects in t - 1, in which 
case she will receive a return in t in the form of land. If she makes the third 
choice, she faces the same three choices with the land so received. The same is 
true of sellers in period t of shares of firms that invested in the U or V projects in 
period t - 1. 
Now consider World C', a refinement of World C. As with B', the model is 
modified to permit the investor to invest in intermediaries in period t. Assume that 
each unit of land invested in an intermediary creates a separate entity.13 As in 
World B’, assume that the typical investor in period t does not possess much 
information about the prospect of the X and Y projects. Nor does she possess 
much information about the project choice skills of the firms that in t - 1 invested 
in the U and V projects. A financial intermediary can again perform the function 
of being a more knowledgeable person to whom to delegate the range of decisions 
that the investor would otherwise have to make. At each level of decision, 
working from the individual investor through to the person making the actual 
decision to fund a real investment or to change control, the decision-maker – 
through some combination of gathering information for himself, seeking advice 
and delegation – deals with the problem that others have much relevant 
knowledge that he lacks. An analogy to a hierarchical organization can again be 
made. Each new project funded and each control reassignment occurring in period 
t is the result of a structure of decision that can be traced back to an investor, but 
others play important roles within the structure. 
E. Outline of a Theory and Its Application  
In a world with real investment projects yielding uncertain returns and an uneven 
initial distribution of information, the use of competitive markets to make the 
economy's decisions does not, as it does in World A, eliminate the need for each 
individual investor to collect pieces of information from, seek the advice of, or 
delegate decisions to, other persons who possess bits of information that the 
individual investor does not have. The analysis that follows takes seriously the 
                                                          
13 This unrealistic assumption is made to simplify the exposition of the particular points developed 
in this model. It ignores the fact that economies of scale are a vital reason why an investor chooses 
to delegate decisions to an intermediary rather than gather and process information about real 
investment opportunities themselves. 
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analogy of the market-based system of making project choice and control 
reassignment decisions to a hierarchical organization suggested by World C’. This 
seemingly incongruous analogy is, of course, highly imperfect. To start, the 
analogy ignores the existence of economies of scale both in the production of 
goods and in the information gathering and processing undertaken by corporate 
officials and financial intermediaries with regard to real or financial investment 
opportunities. These economies of scale drive both firms and financial 
intermediaries to seek funds from multiple sources.14 The analogy also sidesteps 
the role played by prices in secondary securities markets and the capacity of the 
mechanisms of market efficiency to push these prices toward reflecting the views 
of the best informed investors. And it ignores the ability of a person who is more 
sure of his views than others to magnify his influence in project choice by 
dividing up the income stream produced by a proposed project and offering to 
invest a given amount of her savings in the project in return for the right to 
receive the riskiest portion of the stream, with others investing in the project in 
return for the right to receive the less risky portions. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, the analogy, it will be seen, guides the inquiry into the relationship 
between finance and innovation in a useful fashion.  
The theory here will be developed in two steps. The first step, developed 
in Part III, is a micro analysis: a study of the structure which determines how any 
particular project choice or control reassignment decision at the real level is made. 
The second step is a macro analysis: a study of how the finance process functions 
as a system and its impact on innovation. 
The micro-analysis is informed by the enormous progress, on both the 
theoretical and empirical fronts, that has been made over the last few decades in 
the economics of contracts and organization and in corporate finance. It starts at 
the level of a proponent seeking project funding. The messages which such a 
proponent emits to possible funding sources are examined. Next, top 
managements of established corporations are analyzed. A series of questions are 
raised and dealt with. How does corporate management process information 
emitted by investment project proponents? What other information does corporate 
management look at to make these decisions? What values do corporate managers 
seek to satisfy, and how are the decisions they make related to these values? How 
are these decisions influenced by how the decisions will appear to financial 
intermediaries, investor advisory services, and investors themselves? Finally, 
what kinds of information does top corporate management emit to such other 
                                                          
14 These scale requirements for modern industry compound the need for delegation of decision-
making because, even if each investor were as informed and capable as the delegate, the 
coordination among a large number of investors necessary to make group decisions is impractical 
for most questions. 
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entities and persons? The same kind of analysis, one step up the ladder, is then 
made with respect to the principals of financial intermediaries. 
The macro analysis starts with the proposition that every economy, 
whether centralized, pure market, or otherwise, needs a process which takes 
account of information held by disparate sources in order to decide which real 
investment projects shall receive society's scarce savings. In a centralized 
economy, this would be a simple hierarchical organization. In a market economy, 
the process also has some features that resemble a simple hierarchical 
organization, but given the millions of individual investors, is much more 
complex. Our goal for this process is to enhance the capacity of the economy’s 
finance process to identify and implement the most promising investment 
projects, to the extent that doing so is cost effective and consistent with 
maintaining production and output choice efficiency. The most promising projects 
are typically innovative ones. Part VI will make some judgments concerning what 
characteristics an economy’s finance process should have in order to best serve 
this goal. These judgments will be made by seeing how the elements studied in 
the micro analysis aggregate and by referring to a rich body of social science 
literature concerning organizations as communications phenomena. These 
judgments will be tested in Part VII by some crude empiricism, using stylized 
facts about the U.S. economy in the 1970s and 1980s versus the last fifteen years 
and versus the economies in Japan and continental western Europe in the last 
fifteen years. In Part VIII, these judgments will be applied to identify the features 
of the corporate and securities law of publicly traded firms that would best 
promote innovation. 
III. MICRO ANALYSIS 
The micro analysis discussion begins with an examination of two basic concepts: 
the special characteristics of information as a commodity and general principles 
as to how individuals and organizations process incoming information. This is 
followed by a brief sketch of each level of decision-making that plays a potential 
role in determining whether an investment project proposal is implemented – the 
individual proponent of the project, the established corporation that makes 
funding decisions relating to proposals by its employees, and various types of 
financial intermediaries – in terms of the incentives of the actor, the way the actor 
will process incoming information and the communications the actor will emit.  
A.  Information as a Special Commodity 
As is well known, information is not a commodity that is typically bought and 
sold on a piece-by-piece basis in the ordinary fashion. The extreme imperfections 
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in the market for information are key reasons for the development of firms and 
financial intermediaries, and of financial information services that provide 
investors, financial intermediaries and firms with advice as to the best financial or 
real investments. They also help explain why these activities are not significantly 
threatened by the potential competition of investors purchasing raw information 
for themselves to use in making direct investments in real investment 
opportunities.  
1. Economies of scale  
One source of information's uniqueness as a commodity is that, above and beyond 
what must be paid the seller of a piece of information, information is costly to 
find and to utilize. Intermediaries and information services save the investor time 
by gathering and processing the information for him. There are enormous 
economies of scale in gathering and processing the same information for multiple 
individuals. An intermediary can make an investment decision for, and an 
information service can give advice to, thousands of investors with millions of 
dollars in resources using little more effort gathering and processing information 
than one investor acting on his own would have to exert if he wanted to make a 
decision of the same quality.15 
2. Economies of scope 
The other source of information’s uniqueness relates to the existence of econ-
omies of scope in terms of gathering different bits of information. A firm, 
financial intermediary or investment information provider is likely to be serving 
aggregate investment resources of considerable size, usually ultimately traceable 
to many different individual investors. As a result, for the economies of scale 
reasons discussed just above, the aggregate gain to such a person or entity from 
finding better investment opportunities justifies, on a cost benefit basis, gathering 
and analyzing far more different bits of information than the typical individual 
would likely gather because of the much smaller gain he could acquire from using 
it. Economies of scope arise from gathering so many more bits of different 
information because, with this higher volume, the firm, financial intermediary or 
                                                          
15 In terms of speculative profits from trading already outstanding securities, these economies are 
counterbalanced by the fact that the more broadly dispersed the information, the greater the effect 
on the demand and hence on the price of the security involved, and the less profit that can be 
obtained by trading on the information. This tradeoff is much less severe in the case of the finance 
process steering funds to the real investment projects with the best prospects. Of course an 
investor’s returns on an investment in a real project are affected by the economy’s aggregate 
amount investment in this and any other projects based on the same idea. 
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information service can cost effectively have an employment or other relational 
contract arrangement with its information sources. Such an arrangement greatly 
facilitates the acquisition of information, but it is only practical if there is a 
regular transmission over time of large amounts of information.  
There are three reasons why an employment or other relational contract 
arrangement is often the superior forum for transfer of information. First, as 
Coase famously pointed out, there is a cost in using the price mechanism which 
makes it, under some circumstances, uneconomical in comparison with other 
forms of allocation.16 Relative to the usually low value of the typical individual bit 
of information, this cost can be large. The generation and transfer of information 
by command within an organization will avoid this cost and thus will often be 
more economical than use of the market to acquire information.17  
Second, compared to an individual investor, a firm, financial intermediary 
or investment information provider is frequently able to provide much more 
incentive to an information source to produce and provide information. This again 
relates to the public goods aspect of information: once a piece of information has 
been produced (discovered), the cost of transmission to other people is very low. 
Because of the intangible nature of the commodity, once the producer has 
revealed the piece of information to one person, it is difficult, unless the 
information is subject to some kind easily enforceable intellectual property 
protection, for the producer to have it excluded from use by others. The dilemma 
faced by the private producer is that he wants to maximize his rents and have the 
information used only as widely as the producer of any valuable input would want 
it used (i.e., to the point where MR=MC). The revelation of the information to 
another undermines his monopoly position, since anyone who receives it can then 
“produce” additional units of it at very low marginal cost. If an information 
source and a firm, financial intermediary or investment information provider are 
in an employment or other relational contract arrangementwith each other, they 
can agree that the information will not be revealed to others. They can then share 
the larger rents that will result from limiting the scope of decisions based on the 
information or the spread of advice utilizing the information.  
Third, there are barriers to the transfer of information through ordinary 
market transactions because it is hard for a user to evaluate information without 
                                                          
16 Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (N.S. 1937). See also John 
Commons, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS (1934). Problems with the price mechanism include: the costs 
of discovering what the relevant prices are, and the dilemma between the cost of negotiating and 
concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction and the inflexibility of a non-
relational long-term contract to avoid these negotiating costs. 
17 Coase, supra note 16, at 391. 
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learning it, at which point there is no need to pay for it.18 Since suppliers of 
information are likely to demand payment or a promise to pay before revealing 
their information, there is an incentive for users to get their information only from 
suppliers who have established their trustworthiness over an extended, continuous 
relationship. The establishment by a source of such trustworthiness is a 
component of, in the language of the next section, the “authority” of the source in 
the eyes of the user. As information frequently becomes just one component of an 
investment decision, the supplier may not be sure himself of the value of the 
information because such an assessment requires specialized knowledge which 
the user alone has. In this situation, the trustworthiness of the supplier is not 
adequate evidence that the knowledge is worth using, and the user will still be 
reluctant in advance to pay or promise to pay for the information. In such a 
situation, there is a particularly strong incentive for an employment or relational 
contract arrangement allowing for an ex post settling up that accurately reflects 
the information’s value, rather than an ordinary market link between them.19 
B. Rules Relating to Incoming Information: Authority and Interest 
Each participant in the finance process gathers and processes information, either 
messages from others or physical observations about the world, in order to 
determine what his best course of action will be. An individual or organization is 
physically capable of gathering an enormous number of bits of information at 
quite low cost. But processing this information – absorbing it and calculating how 
it should influence the recipient's choice of alternatives – is costly in terms of 
time. Thus, the recipient needs to assign priorities to incoming messages. The 
higher the priority, the more likely the message will be considered seriously and 
influence the recipient's behavior. Priority is assigned by rules: authority rules and 
interest rules. 
                                                          
18 Kenneth Arrow discusses these second and third reasons considered in the text as to why an 
employment or relational contract arrangement may be the superior forum for information transfer 
in Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION 
OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 616, Richard R. Nelson, ed. (1962). For discussions by Arrow that more 
explicitly consider the aspects of information that help define the borderline between decisions 
made by formal organizations and those made by the market, see Kenneth Arrow, THE LIMITS OF 
ORGANIZATION 33– 43 (1974); Kenneth Arrow, Vertical Integration and Communication, 6 BELL 
J. ECON. 173 (1975). 
19 Oliver Williamson points out that in addition to the virtue of an employment relationship in 
building the authority of the information source through what he refers to as “experience ratings,” 
it imbues the source and recipient with a sense of joint purpose which also facilitates transfer. 
Oliver Williamson, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 36 (1975). 
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1. Authority rules 
Authority rules assign priority to incoming information on the basis of its source. 
They relate to the recipient's opinion of the competence and trustworthiness of the 
source. The recipient is essentially using the source as a substitute for gathering 
and processing the information himself. Competence is a concern because the 
source is rarely just a conduit. Rather, the messages the source emits are in part 
based on her interpretations of the information that she in turn has received. 
Trustworthiness is a concern because the source, in deciding what messages to 
emit, may have an interest in manipulating the recipient into acting in a fashion 
which is different from what, given the objective facts, is in the recipient's own 
best interests. 
The degree of authority that a recipient assigns to a message from a 
particular source is determined by several factors. The first is incentive-based 
authority: does the source have any reason to transmit information in a way that 
would create a false or misleading impression? Second is the reputation of the 
source: what do other persons, who themselves have authority, say about the 
source in terms of competency and motivation? Finally, and most importantly, is 
experience-based authority: what has been the recipient’s past experience with the 
source? Authority rules, like other rules of information processing, are subject to 
feedback, and over the long run the quality of the messages from any particular 
source will affect the authority that the source enjoys. 
Information can range from being raw data to being highly conclusionary. 
The most conclusionary information is a naked recommendation to the recipient 
as to what course of action he should take. The more conclusionary the 
information, the more important authority is in determining its priority. 
2. Interest rules 
Interest rules refer to rules that assign priority because of the content of 
information: what it is about. A recipient is concerned with only certain kinds of 
messages: those that analysis or experience suggest would be useful in 
determining the course of action that will best correspond to his particular 
interests. A securities analyst who is an expert in the automobile industry is 
valued and compensated for sending out very specialized kinds of messages. His 
interest rules in terms of processing incoming information emitted by others 
would obviously be quite different from those of an analyst who is an expert in 
the cosmetics industry. Similarly, a mutual fund that has a declared policy of 
investing in blue chip stocks has very different interest rules from a venture 
capital firm specializing in high technology companies, but each would give 
relatively high priority to a much broader range of information than would the 
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auto or cosmetics securities analysts. An individual investor would typically have 
a very broad range of interests – because she is interested in knowing which 
among the huge variety of investment opportunities available are the best places 
to put her savings. But she also would usually prefer to receive information in 
highly conclusionary form. Thus, information from sources which are not highly 
authoritative does not get much priority from individual investors. 
C. Information Flow: Proponents 
Every proposed investment project is assumed to have a proponent – a single 
individual seeking funding to implement the project that she intends to run.20 The 
proponent offers the combination of an idea and the willingness and desire to 
bring the idea into reality should the project acquire funding. The proponent may 
be an employee of an established firm appealing to her superiors. Alternatively, 
she may be a person who developed the idea at the established firm where she 
worked but is seeking external funding to implement it independent of this firm, 
or a university based or wholly independent person who is seeking external 
funding.  
A proponent is likely to know more about the prospects of her project than 
anyone else, although others know information relevant to predicting the project’s 
future that she does not know. She also has an interest in the project being funded. 
Thus what she knows is very important to everyone else in the chain of decision 
between her and the ultimate investors who would supply the funds, but, 
inherently, what she says is not totally trustworthy. 
Proponents who are employees of an established firm seeking funding 
from top management need to rely primarily on experienced-based authority. 
Incentive-based authority is hard to establish within the kinds of compensation 
arrangements that appear workable in established firms. Proponents who appeal to 
outside sources of funding have less experience based-authority in the eyes of 
these sources. Incentive-based authority and reputation-based authority are thus 
more important.  
In the case of highly innovative project proposals, the fact that a proponent 
seeking internal financing must rely relatively more on experience-based 
authority makes, at the margin, internal finance less attractive relative to external 
finance. This is because many of the best such ideas are gestalt phenomena which 
may come from people with little previous experience or accomplishment in the 
area of concern. Skepticism of some relevant, broadly held scientific belief is 
often a precondition for original thinking. Moreover, the typical proponent in 
                                                          
20 The proponent could also be a small cohesive team of individuals, but for convenience, the 
proponent will be treated throughout this discussion as though it is a single individual. 
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industries characterized by rapid technical change is young and highly mobile, 
reducing the opportunities to develop experience-based authority in the eyes of 
the top managers of his current employer. 
Internal finance is also relatively less attractive at the margin in the case of 
highly innovative proposals for reasons related to the information asymmetry 
between the proponent and the funding source. For both innovative proposals and 
more routine ones, there is likely to be greater asymmetry between the proponent 
and the external source than between the proponent and an internal source. The 
difference is likely to be less pronounced in the case of an innovation-based 
proposal, however, because the internal source does not have the same advantage 
when the project is not replicating something the firm is already doing.   
The fact that external sources have some relative advantages over internal 
sources in the case of highly innovative proposals, combined with one of the 
causes of innovation – high employee mobility across firms – helps explain why 
highly innovative industries tend to be geographically concentrated, with most of 
the principal firms and external funding sources all geographically close to one 
another. The greater relative need for external finance makes reputation-based 
authority more important. Reputation-based authority is more likely to develop in 
an industry with high employee mobility if all persons are close to one another. 
D. Project Funding within an Established Corporation 
The top management of a large established corporation stands in the position of 
an intermediary in the information and decision delegation network that runs from 
individual savers to project proponents. Top management makes real investment 
decisions: which of its employees’ proposed projects to implement. It also makes 
financial decisions: the making of distributions to shareholders (dividends, 
liquidating payments, and share repurchases), and the obtaining of outside 
financing. It also must decide what messages to emit to financial intermediaries, 
investment advisers, and the general investing public. In making these decisions, 
each member of the top management group, like most individuals, can be 
assumed to be personally interested in compensation, perquisites, respect, power, 
affection of those around him, and a sense of rectitude. He is also assumed to 
have a strong desire to retain his job. Management can be expected to make 
decisions in the ways which it perceives best further these interests, subject to the 
constraints within which it operates. This section will first examine the way top 
management receives and processes information and then the strategies it employs 
to make the decisions that, given its evaluation of the consequences of different 
actions, are the most advantageous to its personal interests.21 
                                                          
21 What follows in the text attempts to sketch out a brief, informal theory that emphasizes an 
information processing and incentives perspective that fits into the larger organizational theory 
19
Fox: Promoting Innovation: The Law of Publicly Traded Corporations
1. Information processing 
Bits of information relevant to the decisions of top management may have their 
origins inside or outside the firm. Either way, they are likely to be processed as 
they make their way toward the top managers of a firm. The processing has two 
functions: (a) to make available to the managers the expertise of other members of 
the organization so that managers can best estimate the probability distribution of 
possible outcomes from implementation of each idea, and (b) to reduce, by 
eliminating those least critical to the managers' decisions, the total number of 
information bits reaching top managers to a number they can handle. Top 
management is motivated to make this information collection and processing 
system work as well as is possible for any given level of cost. 
It has already been suggested that project proponents are motivated in 
many situations to emit information different from what would be the most 
helpful to top management. The ultimate source of any other kinds of information 
used directly or derivatively by the top managers presents the same motivational 
                                                                                                                                                              
approach of this article. There is, of course, a huge and rich literature that cuts the investment 
decision by firms from a wide number of perspectives which would need to be considered to give 
a fuller account. Representative works include the following.  JOSHEPH SCHUMPETER, THE 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934, Opie trans.); ZOLTAN J. ACS & DAVID B. 
AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS (1990) ; Kathy Fogel et al., Big Business Stability 
and Economic Growth: Is What’s Good for General Motors What’s Good for America?, Available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=916547; PHILIPE AGHION & PETER HOWITT, ENDOGENOUS GROWTH 
THEORY (1998); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982); M. L. Tushman and P. Anderson, Technological Discontinuties and 
Organizational Environments, 31 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 439 (1986), 439; OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Benjamin Klein, et al., Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 297 (1978); 
OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, 13-91 (1995). CLAYTON M. 
CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA (1999); S. McDonald, Learning to Change: An 
Information Perspective on Learning in the Organization, 6 ORG. SCIENCE 557 (1995); T. BUMS 
AND G. STALKER, The Management of Innovation; I. BRIGHT, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION; A. Rubenstein, Organization and Research and Development 
Decision-Making Within the Decentralized Firm, in Richard R. Nelson, ed., The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity, pp. 385—394; E. ROBERTS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
TECHNOLOGY; BURTON KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS; A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND 
STRUCTURE; W. Strassmann, The Risks of Innovation in Twentieth Century Manufacturing 
Methods, 5 TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 215(1964), OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND 
HIERARCHIES, 122—127; Monsen and Downs, A Theory of Large Managerial Firms, 73 in J. POL. 
ECON. 221 (1975), Z. Block, Can Corporate venturing Succeed?, 3 J. BUSINESS STRATEGY 21
(1982); N. Fast, A Visit to the New venture Graveyard, 22 RESEARCH MANAGEMENT 18 (1979); J. 
MEYER AND E. KUH, THE INVESTMENT DECISION (1957); C. F. CARTER AND B. R. WILLIAMS, 
INVESTMENT IN INNOVATION (1958); R. Marris, The Corporation and Economic Theory, in R. 
Marris and A. Wood, eds., The Corporate Economy (1971). 
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problem for top managers, as do any information intermediaries that stand 
between top managers and the project proponent, or other ultimate sources of 
information. Top management as it processes the information it receives, must 
utilize organizational skill to reduce the incentives for this behavior at each level 
and to account for the distortions that remain. In the effort to correct for bias, a 
certain residual amount of uncertainty is inevitable at each level through which 
information is gathered, analyzed and summarized as it makes its way toward top 
management. The larger the firm, the more such levels there will be and the 
greater the uncertainty by the time the information reaches the top. 
For a firm whose top managers have a given level of organizational skill, 
the seriousness of the uncertainty generated by the possibility of manipulative 
information depends on the nature of the idea that the information concerns. A 
typical firm tends to specialize in certain areas. This specialization is reflected in 
the training and job histories of its personnel. And within its areas of specialty, it 
develops experiences and understandings of what has and has not worked in the 
past. This experience helps determine the firm's interest rules: which information 
gets attention and which does not. Thus, even within its areas of specialty, a firm 
tends to tolerate only a narrow range of ideas. Burton Klein, for example, 
concludes that this tendency explains why, when he looked at the histories of a 
number of industries, he found that a precondition for a period of rapid innovation 
was a minimum of four to eight firms accounting for 50 percent of the market.22
This combination of specialization and experience makes the firm highly 
sensitive to the possibilities of certain ideas. But the trade-off is that it is relatively 
insensitive to the possibilities of many others. A firm's narrowness is likely to 
take on a conservative shade as both its authority and interest rules ossify over 
time and block the types of information that result in innovative investment. 
Anthony Downs suggests as a matter of organizational theory that the older the 
organization, the less receptive it is to innovative ideas.23 Organizations develop 
rigid rules on the basis of experience and become prisoners of their past 
successes. Ruth Mack comes to a similar conclusion using a somewhat more 
complete theory. She suggests that human beings lack tolerance for actions 
involving what she terms “ambiguity”: actions whose riskiness is difficult to 
evaluate.24 Because established organizations have past experience that enables 
them to evaluate very capably the risks associated with certain kinds of actions, 
intolerance of ambiguity leads them to favor such actions over innovative actions, 
with which by definition they have no experience. There is empirical evidence 
                                                          
22 BURTON KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS 78, 82. 
23 Anthony Downs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 18-20 (1998). 
24 Ruth Mack, PLANNING ON UNCERTAINTY 55-58 (1971) 
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suggesting that older firms are unable to find projects in which to reinvest their 
earnings which are as profitable as those found by newer firms.25 
2. Decisionmaking and message emissions 
  
The discussion that follows relates to the top managers of established firms with 
dispersed ownership, a source of a very large portion of all real investment project 
funding in the United States. All the production, project funding and information 
emission decisions of these managers have the potential, directly or indirectly, to 
affect their personal interests. Some of the decisions which would further their 
personal interests may be ones that are not in the best interests of shareholders. To 
the extent that managers can resolve such conflicts in their own favor without 
significantly increasing the likelihood of the primary threats to their jobs—
bankruptcy and hostile takeover—they will do so. A resolution of conflict in 
management's favor, if detected with reasonable assurance by an outsider, may, 
however, demonstrate the possibility of a profitable hostile takeover. Thus, 
management should, in making real and financial decisions that pose such a 
conflict, resolve the conflict in its favor only where detection is unlikely.  
Set out below is a strategy that would maximize managerial interests. The 
underlying premise is that managers can maximize their own interests by 
maximizing the free cash flow of the corporation over time discounted to present 
value. This guide is subject to the constraint that managers should refrain from 
pursing this goal beyond the point where it risks a hostile takeover by sufficiently 
depressing share value in an observable way. Hostile takeover becomes a risk 
when outsiders are able to ascertain that a substantial gap likely exists between 
management’s course of action and what would maximize share value.  
The proposition that the goal of top management is to maximize the firm’s 
free cash flow over time discounted to present value reflects the concept that the 
larger the available cash flow, the greater the capacity of the firm over time to 
satisfy interests of each of the top managers: compensation, luxury perquisites, 
                                                          
25 Henry Grabowski & Dennis Mueller, Life Cycle Effects on Corporate Returns and Retentions, 
57 REV. ECON. & STAT. 400 (1975). See Dennis C. Mueller & S. Lawrence Yun, Rates of Return 
Over the Firm's Lifecycle,7 INDUST. AND CORP. CHANGE, 347, 352--53 (1998) (finding that 
“[y]oung firms earned higher returns on investment than old ones in general”). Established firms 
vary, of course, in the extent, if any, to which they fall victim to these problems. Firms in lines of 
business where there is a high rate of technical change are, by the very nature of the kinds of ideas 
they are specialized in assessing, more likely to find and implement positive NPV projects. Firms 
with substantial R&D budgets appear to do better because internally generated ideas are more 
likely to get favorable attention. Structural innovations such as corporate venturing can sometime 
help. Particularly well led firms may also self-consciously try to organize in ways to overcome the 
tendency of established firms to develop the problems discussed in the text. 
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respect, power, affection of those around him, and a sense of rectitude. A 
“diversion” of a certain absolute amount from the available cash flow in any one 
period to pay greater compensation, and provide more perquisites, than is compet-
itively necessary is a smaller percentage of a large available cash flow than of a 
small one.26 Thus it is harder to detect. The same is true of a diversion of a given 
amount to engage in an activity which gives top management a sense of rectitude 
for “doing good” but which does not contribute to firm profitability. This goal 
also implies, after deduction for management compensation and expenses, the 
largest possible growth in firm assets (subject, of course, to the constraint that 
each project invested in is not expected to lose money). The larger the firm’s 
assets, the greater the respect and power that attaches to a top management job.27 
The greater the rate of growth of the assets, the more frequent the opportunities 
for promotion, thereby improving the relations between top managers and those 
directly below them.28 
The strategy is as follows. How far top management can successfully 
pursue this strategy depends on the larger institutional and legal framework within 
which the established firm operates.    
1. The debt/equity ratio should be kept low. A lower debt/equity ratio 
reduces the risk of job loss through bankruptcy and increases free cash flow.29  
2. The firm should have the best information generating and processing 
functions possible for any given level of cost in order to identify the best new 
investment project proposals. It should use the predictions derived from these 
functions to identify a list of the best investment opportunities that can be found 
according to expected rates of return adjusted for systematic risk.  
3. The firm should retain as high a percentage of cash flow as shareholder 
pressure will permit, and make investments going down the list of opportunities 
as far as the money retained will take the firm. It should do so even if some or all 
                                                          
26 See Javier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 Q. J. 
ECON. 49, 67-70 (2008) (“[B]oth aggregate firm size and individual firm size appear to be strongly 
significant determinants of CEO compensation.” with compensation increasing with firm size); 
George P. Baker, Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, Compensation and Incentives: 
Practice vs. Theory, 43 J. FIN. 593 (1988) (noting that “a 10 percent larger firm will pay its 
executives an average of 3 percent more”); Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and 
Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 11, 32-37 (1985) (finding 
that a firm whose sales increase will increase its CEO's salary and bonus). 
27 The idea that managers gain utility simply from the size of the firm they run has a long history. 
See, for example, FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921); JOSEPH A. 
SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ROBERT A. GORDON, BUSINESS 
LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION (1945). 
28 Oliver Williamson has argued that expansion is an effective way of settling disputes among 
managers. OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 120. 
29 See, e.g., Michael Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, THE REVOLUTION 
IN CORPORATE FINANCE (Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew Jr. eds., 3d ed. 1998). 
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of the projects have negative NPVs, i.e., have risk-adjusted expected rates of 
return less than the rate at which shareholders on average could earn on the 
money in the market if returned to them.  As long as the project has an expected 
return greater than zero, it will still add to the value of the firm’s expected free 
cash flow over time. If, after going down the list and exhausting its retained cash 
flow, the firm still has unimplemented positive NPV projects, it should raise 
external funds to implement these projects as well, assuming that the cash outflow 
discounted to present value associated with the terms of the financing is less the 
cash inflow from having invested in the project discounted to present value.30  
4. This strategy may not be in the best interests of shareholders, since it 
contemplates the possibility of investing in negative NPV projects. Top 
management should therefore minimize, for any given level of corporate 
performance, the chance of hostile takeover. They can minimize this risk by 
consistently issuing predictions relevant to future distributions to shareholders 
that are as accurate as possible, but doing so in highly conclusionary form (i.e., 
without giving the facts on which the predictions are based). They should issue as 
little other information about the corporation as possible. This combination of 
accurate predictions with minimal substantive disclosure minimizes the kind of 
information asymmetry that results in share price being discounted in the capital 
markets, while not providing the kind of information that would lead to reductions 
in the agency costs of management. This strategy is aided by avoiding outside 
financing, especially publicly issued equity, unless it would permit the firm to 
invest in a positive NPV project, because the use of external finance tends require 
additional disclosure.31  
E. Project Funding from Financial Intermediaries 
If a project proponent seeks funding for a new project directly from an outside 
source and does not go directly to actual individual investors (“angel investors”), 
the two likely sources are a bank or a venture capital firm. Each of these financial 
intermediaries is motivated, like the top management of an established firm, to 
have the best information generating and processing functions possible for any 
given level of cost, in order to identify the best new investment opportunities -
available to it.  
                                                          
30 External financing can be expensive because of the information asymmetries between 
management and external capital sources. These asymmetries may be particularly great with 
respect to the prospects of novel investment projects. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf. 
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors do 
not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984). 
31 See Frank Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650 
(1984). 
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Unlike established firm top management, however, neither of these 
financial intermediaries is likely to be tempted, in order to maximize growth and 
size, to extend funds on terms that would make any of its investments negative 
NPV propositions. This is because top managers of established firms with more 
free cash flow than positive NPV projects into which to invest have funds derived 
from non-redeemable equity. Banks, on the other hand, obtain most of their funds 
not from equity but from deposits and certificates of deposit that are subject to 
redemption or must be rolled over frequently. The shares of venture capital firms 
are also typically redeemable after a certain point in the life of the firm. In 
addition, their managers typically will want to form new funds, which puts a high 
premium on the returns they make on their existing funds. 
The structure of the terms on which funds are extended by banks differs 
greatly from this structure with respect to venture capital firms. This difference 
makes a venture capital firm a far more promising source for funding innovative 
projects than is a bank.  
1. Banks 
The terms on which banks extend loans involve repayment of fixed principal plus 
interest, which may or may not be paid depending on the outcome of the project. 
The only way to compensate for the risk of less than full repayment is for the 
terms to provide for a higher rate of interest. As Stiglitz and Weiss have 
explained, given the information asymmetry between the proponent and the bank 
as the funding source, an adverse selection problem is created that leads to credit 
rationing and the rational refusal to fund positive NPV projects.32 This credit 
rationing problem is accentuated in the case of a highly innovative project 
proposal because the information asymmetry will typically be greater with such 
proposals. Banks also rely more on collateral, which the real investment uses of 
funding for a highly innovative project are less likely to provide.33 Given the 
availability of the venture capital alternative, the relative disadvantage of banks as 
funders of highly innovative projects is self reinforcing because bank personnel 
will not find it rewarding to specialize in assessing these kinds of investment 
opportunities and will gain skill from experience.34 Bank personnel are also less 
                                                          
32 Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. 
REV. 393 (1981). 
33 Masako Ueda, Banks versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening, and 
Expropriation, 59 J. FIN. 601 (2004). 
34 Atanassov, Nanda and Seru find that U.S. firms that rely on relationship banking as their 
funding source are less innovative as measured by patent data than those that rely on equity or 
publicly issued debt. They hypothesize that this result is due in part to bank personnel being 
unable to evaluate novel technologies. Julian Atanassov, Vikram Nanda & Amit Seru, Finance 
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able to make such assessments because the structure of the terms on which banks 
extend financing does not make it sensible for banks to offer hands on ongoing 
monitoring and management advice. Because their terms do not involve such 
requirements and services, bank officers do not acquire the intimate knowledge 
about given high tech industries that adds to their abilities to assess new 
proposals.35 
2. Venture capital 
Venture capital avoids the banks’ adverse selection problem of fixed payments by 
instead extending funding on terms that typically involve convertible preferred 
stock. The typical package also includes control rights in the form of positions on 
the board of directors to which the fund has rights. Staged financing also helps 
give the funds control. These features are designed to help deal two problems. 
One is the information asymmetry problem between the proponent and the 
funding source. Second is the fact that the proponent is offering, as a package, an 
investment idea and his still untested management skills. Gilson and Black have 
shown how the optimal venture capital contract is structured around the 
availability of the venture capitalist’s exit through an initial public offering 
(IPO).36 The availability of this mode of exit resolves the “two sided moral hazard 
problem.” One side of the problem derives from the fact that the fund needs 
control rights to protect against the proponent running the company at the expense 
of the fund. The other side derives from the fact that the proponent, having given 
these control rights, needs protection against a hold up. The availability of an exit 
via an IPO also provides the venture fund manager a way of showing current and 
future investors the profitability of their investments. In addition, by facilitating 
the “recycling of funds,” the availability of IPO exit also allows the fund 
managers to maximize the rents earned from their special skills at identifying 
promising projects and at guiding fledgling managers.  
Black and Gilson use this thesis to explain why innovation based start-ups 
occur in much greater numbers in the United States than in Germany or Japan. 
According to their thesis, the existence of a more vibrant public equity market in 
the United States makes this optimal form of venture capital contract more 
available in the United States than elsewhere. This thesis has spawned a 
                                                                                                                                                              
and Innovation: The Case of Publicly Traded Firms (2007)  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=740045.
35 Andrew Winton & Vijay Yerramilli, Entrepreneurial Finance: Banks vsersus Venture Capital. 
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=994630. 
36 Bernard S, Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Strucutre of Capital Markets: 
Banks versus Stock Market, 47 J.FIN.ECON. 243 (1996). 
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considerable literature, much of it affirmatively refining Black and Gilson’s basic 
observations.37  
IV. MACRO ANALYSIS 
The preceding micro analysis investigated how the various parts of a market 
based financial system work to make any particular project choice decision. The 
question addressed here is how the system works as a whole. The macro analysis 
starts with the proposition that every economy, whether centralized, pure market, 
or otherwise, needs a process which takes account of information held by 
disparate sources in order to decide which real investment projects shall receive 
society's scarce savings. The goal that we want this process to serve is enhancing 
the capacity of the economy’s system of finance to identify and implement the 
most promising investment projects to the extent that doing so is cost effective 
and consistent with maintaining production and output choice efficiency.  
The task of the finance process choosing among real investment proposals 
is one of discovery. Technological possibilities change with each passing time 
period. In the end, the quality of the decisions is ultimately determined by how the 
system handles information. The system has rules for handling information, but is 
capable of modifying these rules with experience through feedback. In doing so, it 
can steer itself toward the goal of finding the best projects and can be judged by 
how well it does so.  
A. Communications Rigidity 
Organizational theorists have identified a variety of pathologies that commonly 
afflict simple hierarchical organizations.38 Most of these pathologies can be 
                                                          
37 A fuller account of the role of venture capital beyond the brief sketch presented in the text 
would require a discussion of this literature. See Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the 
Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674 (2000); Ronald J. Gilson, 
Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1067 (2003); Ralph Becker and Thomas Hellmann, The Genesis of Venture Capital - Lessons from 
the German Experience (2003); Bronwyn H. Hall. The Financing of Researach and Development, 
18 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POLICY 35 (2002); D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in 
the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133 (1998); Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal 
Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms,
2002 WIS L. REV. 45 (2002), Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical 
Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L.& ECON. 463 (1996); Ronald Gilson & 
Joseph Bankman, Why Start-ups?, 51 STAN L. REV. 289 (1999); Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market 
for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate 
Governance Debate, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 865 (1997). 
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classified as aspects of what we might call “communications rigidity.” 
Communications rigidity is the result of an overemphasis on efficiency of 
communication rather than the efficiency of the organizational performance as a 
whole. Efficiency of communication requires the minimum number of bits of 
information to be passed from one participant to another and the minimum 
amount of original input on the part of each participant (thus, by this definition, an 
organization which has much routine passing of messages and documents from 
one participant to another might still be called communications efficient). 
There seems to be a natural tendency for an organization to acquire 
communications rigidity to the extent that there are not forces to prevent it. The 
system fails to react to changes in environment, including good new ideas, 
because the organization uses routine communications methods. Such methods 
employ highly selective authority and interest rules and highly information-
digestive symbols. As a result, these mechanisms screen out information 
concerning changes in the environment or prevent such information from reaching 
those persons who could most appreciate its implications.39 If the system does not 
have an adequate feedback process, these failures are not recognized and 
corrected. 
It is possible for the finance process in an economy to display such 
communications rigidity. The system could be very communications efficient in 
the sense of using a relatively small amount of real resources for information 
gathering, processing and transmission. In a world where the pace of scientific 
discovery is slow, such communications efficiency might be ideal. The savings in 
real resources devoted to information would not come at an undue cost in terms of 
other measures of organizational performance. But where there is a rapid rate of 
scientific discovery translatable into new products and processes, a high level of 
communications efficiency presents serious problems. Whether an economy in 
such a world in fact suffers from such a problem depends on the effectiveness of 
the system's feedback process, which in turn is related to the legal and cultural 
environment in which it operates.  
B. A World of Slow Change Minimizes Potential System Failures 
The finance process could exhibit three possible kinds of failures in terms of 
finding and implementing the most promising investment projects: (1) not 
choosing for implementation, from among all proposed projects, those that are the 
most promising according to the best evaluations being made, (2) not making the 
                                                                                                                                                              
38 See generally, KARL DEUTSCH, NERVES OF GOVERNMENT (1963); Mack, supra note 24 ; Downs 
supra note 23; HAROLD WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 94-109 (1968). 
39 JAMES MARCH & HERBERT SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 164 (1958). 
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best possible evaluations of the prospects of all proposed projects, and (3) having 
operating costs that, at the margin, are in excess of the benefits that the system 
confers upon the economy. In a world of slow change, however, a system 
dominated by internal finance, supplemented perhaps by close, well established 
relationships between firms and their principal banks, is likely to perform 
reasonably well along all three of these dimensions. As will be discussed 
subsequently, in a world of fast change, a finance process with these attributes is 
likely to exhibit significant failures along the first two dimensions of performance 
and enjoy a kind of false economy with respect to the third.  
1. Failure to use the best available evaluations 
An organization may be structured such that its decision whether or not to 
undertake any particular action does not correspond to what is suggested, given 
the system's goals, by the best evaluation being made in the system concerning 
the consequences of the action. In the case of an economy’s finance process, this 
could happen if firms have a strong internal finance bias. Many firms may be 
implementing projects that their future cash flow evaluations show are negative 
NPV projects.40 The amounts invested in these negative NPV projects are 
amounts not paid out into the markets as dividends. Since society’s savings are 
scarce, the implementation of these negative NPV projects crowds out proposed 
projects of other firms that have been assessed by these other firms as having 
greater net present value.41   
In a world of slow change, however, a system dominated by internal 
finance would not likely seriously display this first type of failure. Consider the 
kind of new project that is likely to be proposed in a world of slow change: a 
replacement of, or an addition to, a similar project already existing in the 
economy. Changes in demand and factor supplies are gradual. Product or process 
                                                          
40 These are negative NPV projects based on the lower discount rate that would reflect the 
project’s undiversifiable risk in a world where there were no other firms displaying this behavior, 
rather than based on the inflated discount rate that they actually face, because many other firms do 
in fact display such behavior. 
41 This crowding out occurs as follows: because the dividends are not paid out, there are fewer 
dollars in the market competing to purchase the rights to future expected cash flows. These future 
cash flows will be priced lower than would otherwise be the case. This inflates the discount rate. 
The firms that forgo implementing more worthwhile projects are ones that have a sufficient 
number of promising investment project proposals, relative to their internally generated funds, that 
not all their promising projects can be internally funded. To maximize share value, these firms will 
need to use this inflated discount rate to calculate the NPV of any project that they cannot fund 
internally. As a result, the firms with a surplus of good projects will not implement proposed 
projects that would be positive NPV projects at the discount rate that would have prevailed if the 
foregone dividends of firms with a deficiency of good projects had been paid, but that are negative 
NPV projects using the inflated discount rate. 
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improvements are minor because that is all the rate of scientific advance permits. 
A replacement of, or extension to, a project already existing in the economy is 
most likely to be proposed by an employee to the top management of the firm 
holding the existing project. A firm that operates in a market with a gradually 
increasing demand or which has a superior record of figuring out minor product 
or process improvements will have a list of projects which are superior to those of 
a firm with the opposite characteristics. It will also be more profitable. Thus, in a 
world of slow change, the distribution of profits anticipates the evaluator's 
evaluations. The most funds automatically go to the evaluators who are being 
presented the most promising projects to evaluate. 
The story applies as well to a finance process where internal finance is 
supplemented by well-established, close banking relationships. In a world of slow 
change, the types of historical data concerning cash flows and asset values on 
which its lending decisions are likely to be based are reasonably reliable 
predictions of future cash flows.  
Even where the match between internally generated funds and good 
project proposals for some firms is sufficiently off that firms seek outside equity, 
this first potential system failure is unlikely to be a serious problem in a world of 
slow change. The price of an equity offering by such a firm will be based 
predominantly on the price at which its already outstanding shares trade in the 
secondary market. Under the efficient market hypothesis, this price will reflect the 
knowledge of the best informed investors concerning the evaluation skills of 
incumbent managers, evaluation skills that have been tested by experience. 
Consider a situation in which a firm’s top managers are good evaluators and these 
managers assess that the firm has more promising projects than it can fund 
internally. These positive facts are likely to be reflected in the share price at 
which the shares can be offered, thereby making the offering to finance the 
project financially worthwhile. As for firms that have more internally generated 
funds than promising investment opportunities, any tendency by management to 
retain these funds to invest in unpromising projects will be more easily detected in 
a world of slow change because, compared to a world of fast change, there are 
fewer alternative explanations for poor returns over time. 
2. Failure to make the best evaluations possible  
An organization may also be structured such that information relevant to 
predicting the consequences of an action is not sent to the persons most capable of 
making these evaluations. In the case of an economy’s finance process, this would 
mean a failure to send information concerning the prospects of a proposed 
investment project to the person most capable of evaluating its prospects. 
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In a world of slow change, however, a system dominated by internal 
finance is also unlikely seriously to display this second type of failure. In the case 
of most project proposals, information concerning the project goes, already highly 
summarized, to just one recipient—the top management of the firm employing its 
proponent—and very little of what is received by top management is passed on to 
finance process participants outside the firm. Such a parsimonious pattern of 
information handling is usually fully appropriate in a world of slow change. In 
such a world, the questions that need to be answered are well defined. Decisions 
can be based on a program relating stimuli to appropriate response which 
feedback processes have shown to work well in the past. The communications 
system can employ well-recognized symbols that incorporate a great deal of 
information. Authority rules will allow participants in the system to be very 
selective in the information to which they pay attention, because it is easy to 
assume the competence and integrity of an information source in the current 
situation if these attributes have been demonstrated many times before in similar 
past situations. The same is true for interest rules because experience tells the 
participant that it is safe to ignore messages of many kinds of content.42 
The small number of people to which information goes with respect to any 
proposed project are in fact the ones who, in a world of slow change, are likely to 
be the best able to use it. The top managers of the firm employing the proponent, 
because of their familiarity with the firms’ existing projects, will have an inherent 
advantage in evaluating the proposed project. Since demand, factor supplies, and 
technology change slowly, they also know well the environment in which the 
project would operate. The organizational winnowing of information and its 
summarization in conclusory language before it reaches the top managers is likely 
to be rational for the same reasons that past experience will be highly relevant to 
the current situation. 
The story again carries through to the extent that internal finance is 
supplemented by a well established, close banking relationship. In a world of slow 
change, a bank with which the firm has a close relationship is in a similar position 
with respect to the firm’s top managers as these top managers are with respect to 
the project proponents.  
3. Cost in excess of benefits  
Information processing by the finance process uses real resources. A system of 
finance dominated by internal finance, perhaps supplemented by lending from 
banks with which firms have close, established relationships, is, by its very 
parsimony in the use of information, the least costly approach. Thus it is unlikely 
                                                          
42 Deutsch, supra note 38, at 170. 
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to display the third potential system failure: costs in excess of benefits. In a world 
of slow change, its low cost is also unlikely to represent a false economy since the 
system is likely to perform well along the other dimensions of system 
performance. 
C. A World of Fast Change 
In  contrast  to  the  world  of  slow  change,  an  internal  finance  dominated
finance process, supplemented perhaps by close bank relationships, might well 
exhibit significant failures along the first two dimensions of system performance 
– using the best evaluations being made and making the best evaluations – in a 
world where scientific advances are rapid. The lower cost of such a finance 
process may be a self-reinforcing false economy. 
1.Using the best evaluations 
  
Consider first using the best available evaluations. There is no mechanism in the 
world of fast change akin to the one in the world of slow change where the profits 
of a firm anticipate the quality of a firm’s list of proposed projects. In particular, 
there is no reason to believe that a firm possessing a good and innovative project 
idea will have corresponding profits to finance the idea internally. Empirical study 
supports the proposition that rapidly innovating companies are more likely to 
require outside financing.43 There is also evidence from earlier decades in the 
United States that firms that relied entirely on internal finance invested in projects 
with substantially lower returns than what shareholders could earn in the market if 
the cash flows of these firms had been returned to them.44 
  
                                                          
43 See, e.g., James Brown, Steven Fazzari & Bruce Petersen, Financing Innovation and Growth: 
Cash Flow, External Equity, and the 1990s R&D Boom, 64 J. FIN. 151 (2009) (“[Y]oung high-tech 
firms typically exhaust internal finance and issue stock as their marginal source of funds”). 
44 See, e.g., Michael Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, THE REVOLUTION 
IN CORPORATE FINANCE (Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew Jr. eds., 3d ed. 1998). GORDON 
DONALDSON, CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY (1961); William J. Baumol et al., Earnings Retention, 
New Capital and the Growth of the Firm, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 345 (1970). For a critical review 
of these and several other studies, along with an estimate of the magnitude of the effects on the 
economy, see MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE: THEORY, PRACTICE 
AND POLICY 233-37 (1988). See also Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The 
Implications of “Discounted” Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 898 
(1988). 
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2. Making the best evaluations 
  
The even bigger problem, however, may be the failure to get information 
concerning proposed projects to those best able to evaluate them. To see why, let 
us start with some very abstract observations, treating the finance process as a 
single organization and equating its ability to find new promising projects to its 
ability to innovate. Innovation involves the search for alternatives and evaluation 
of their expected consequences if pursued. The capacity of an organization to 
innovate relates to its ability to rearrange items of information into new patterns 
and identify the occasions when a particular rearrangement would be useful.45 The 
fewer and more aggregated the pieces of information that flow through the 
system, the fewer the possible rearrangements. For new ideas to make it through 
the communication channels, the symbols used must aggregate less information 
and the authority and interest rules must be less selective. A large portion of the 
participants who have significant impact on the organization's decisions should 
themselves be sensitive to new ideas, i.e., their internal information processing 
structures should have characteristics resembling those desirable for innovative 
organizations. The environment in which they operate should encourage this 
sensitivity. A number of persons, with differing backgrounds, personal in-
formation processing structures, and tastes for risk, should have the opportunity to 
act on the basis of the same idea, not just one. Operating in an uncertain 
environment can also give rise to innovation because the stress involved, by 
making “satisficing” unviable, leads to the questioning of old truths.  
Less autonomy on the part of individual decision makers, while normally 
thought to stifle creativity, can, in a certain form, engender it. If one is required to 
look outside to seek the assistance of a continuously changing list of others, one is 
more challenged and exposed to new ideas. Communications theory suggests a 
number of reasons why autonomy can be inversely related to the capacity for 
innovation. Through habit, autonomous groups tend to overvalue parochial or 
internal sources of information. They block out information from sources with 
wider ranges of experience, since nothing forces them to have contact with such 
sources.46 As a general matter, groups have a bias to let things stay as they are 
because it is easier to agree to let things stay as they are than to agree to institute 
one of several possible changes. 
Autonomy reinforces this tendency by allowing those involved to avoid 
constraints imposed by outsiders that would prevent the solution currently in use 
from continuing to be workable. Advancement within an autonomous group is 
more likely to go to an “organization man” who focuses inwardly on the existing 
internal rules of the group and on how to use them to his advantage rather than to 
                                                          
45 Deutsch, supra note 38, at 108-109 163-165, 172-176. 
46 Id., Burton Klein, supra note 21, at 143-144; Mack, supra note 24, at 150-163. 
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a person who focuses on establishing his worth by taking actions that result, 
directly or indirectly, in reactions by persons outside the group that benefit the 
group.  
3. Self reinforcing tendencies 
Both high and low levels of innovative behavior by an organization are self-
reinforcing. If an organization undergoes only slow change for a period of time, 
the components that succeed are ones that are well adapted to slow change, i.e., 
those that display a high level of information efficiency. The components that are 
well adapted for fast change, which are the likely sources of future innovation, 
have information processing systems that are too costly to survive. Those that 
remain have a vested interest in maintaining slow change. Conversely, if an 
organization undergoes fast change for a period of time, the components that 
succeed are the ones which are well adapted to fast change so there will be many 
sources of future innovation. Each component will be operating in an environment 
of uncertainty, and each is likely to have limited autonomy. Therefore, an 
organization's level of innovativeness may be more a product of its past than of 
outside forces that move it toward some optimal trade-off between innovativeness 
and communications efficiency.  
V. APPLYING THE MACRO ANALYSIS TO DESIGNING THE FINANCE PROCESS 
  
What does the macro analysis suggest about the best design for a finance process 
that would be sensitive to innovative new project proposals? A system that 
resembles the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s is very communications efficient: most 
investment decisions are made internally without need to raise money from 
outside capital markets and there is not much hostile takeover pressure.47 The 
bulk of all project proposals in such a system are made by employees of existing 
firms who communicate their proposals to mangers who know them well. Little 
information needs to leave the firm since little outside finance is being sought.  
As discussed, this information efficiency would be a good thing in a world 
of slow change. Firms with the most internal funds are the ones that are likely to 
be considering the most promising investment project proposals. The top 
managers who evaluate proposals can use rules that have been shown to work 
well in the past. The system is low cost compared to the alternative of cycling 
more funds through external capital markets. More use of external equity markets 
simply risks the costs of split information, i.e. proponents in each firm know well 
the prospects of their proposals but outsiders do not. External funding sources 
                                                          
47 See Part VI for a full discussion of the characteristics of the U.S. finance process at that time. 
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either need to expend a lot to make up for this deficit, or make mistakes whereby 
the wrong projects get funded. 
This information efficiency may be too costly in terms of dynamic 
efficiency in a world with the potential for faster technical change, however. For 
the finance process to be more innovative, it needs the ability, as just discussed, to 
rearrange items of information into new patterns and identify the occasions when 
a particular rearrangement would be useful. For new ideas to make it through the 
system, the symbols used must aggregate less information. Because people vary 
in what they will be sensitive to, proposed projects need the opportunity to be 
exposed to multiple evaluators. People making decisions should not be narrow 
experts. Because people can learn from one another, decisions should not be made 
by persons with too much autonomy, i.e. where each decision-maker has a narrow 
defined clear zone of authority. Also there are benefits to operating in a somewhat 
uncertain environment: stress leads to the questioning of old truths. 
This analysis suggests that a finance process with the following 
characteristics would be more sensitive to the potential of innovative investment 
project proposals.  
1. An active market for corporate control 
2. Relatively high payouts to investors of the cash flows of established 
corporations 
3. A substantial venture capital sector 
4. An active market for IPOs 
5. Relatively accurate share prices in primary and secondary market. 
Put in different terms, the foregoing theoretical analysis suggests that a 
vital and well-functioning equity market with relatively accurate share prices and 
relative transparency concerning the businesses of its issuers will promote 
innovation. Thus a legal regime that promotes high disclosure is important. Such a 
system plays a key role in disciplining management of established firms to find 
the best projects they can and to pay out the rest in cash and in directing external 
equity to the best places. 
Consider first improved price accuracy in the secondary market and the 
disclosure that induces it. Disclosure and more accurate secondary market share 
prices enhance the effectiveness of the social devices that limit the extent to 
which managers of established public corporations place their own interests above 
those of their shareholders (the agency costs of management). To start, additional 
disclosure and increased share price accuracy, by signaling when there are 
problems, assist in both the effective exercise of the shareholder franchise and 
shareholder enforcement of management’s fiduciary duties.48 They also increase 
                                                          
48 See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, in 62 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 113 (1999). This is obvious when disclosures themselves suggest the possible existence 
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the threat of hostile takeover when managers engage in non-share-value-
maximizing behavior. The additional disclosure and more accurate prices make a 
takeover less risky for potential acquirers and reduce the chance that a value-
enhancing acquisition will be deterred by the target having an inaccurately high 
share price.49 Finally, by reducing the riskiness associated with holding an 
issuer’s stock in a less than fully diversified portfolio, additional disclosure 
increases the use of share price-based management compensation, which also 
helps align the interests of managers and shareholders.50 
In terms of the potential pathologies of established firms, a well 
functioning equity market, by adding stress and both positive and negative 
incentives, will reduce the number of promising opportunities that are missed 
because of managerial risk aversity or unquestioned rigid processing rules. It will 
also be more likely to result in the payout of cash rather than its investment in 
negative NPV projects. 
What is also needed is an active market for new share offerings. Elements 
required for this include, again, transparency and price accuracy. Improved price 
accuracy in the primary market for shares produces these social benefits directly. 
For issuer offerings, greater share price accuracy at a time when an issuer 
contemplates implementing a new project by means of a new share offering will 
bring the issuer’s cost of capital more in line with the social cost of investing 
                                                                                                                                                              
of such a problem. It can also occur when a share price declines, indicating, if the price has a 
relatively high level of accuracy, that something is amiss. 
49 The market for corporate control is a well-recognized device for limiting the agency costs of 
management where ownership is separated from control, as in the typical publicly traded 
corporation with dispersed ownership. More information and the resulting increase in price 
accuracy improves the control market’s effectiveness in performing this role. A potential acquirer, 
in deciding whether it is worth paying what it would need to pay to acquire a target that the 
acquirer feels is mismanaged, must make an assessment of what the target would be worth in the 
acquirer’s hands. This assessment is inherently risky and acquirer management is likely to be risk 
averse. Greater disclosure, however, reduces the riskiness of this assessment. Hence, with greater 
disclosure, a smaller apparent deviation between incumbent management decision-making and 
what would maximize share value is needed to impel a potential acquirer into action.  
Also, when share price is inaccurately high, even a potential acquirer that believes for sure 
that it can run the target better than can incumbent management may find the target not worth 
paying for. The increase in share price accuracy that results from greater disclosure reduces the 
chance that a socially worthwhile takeover will be thwarted in this fashion. 
Greater disclosure thus makes the hostile takeover threat more real. Incumbent managers will be 
less tempted to implement negative net present value projects in order to maintain or enlarge their 
empires, or to operate existing projects in ways that sacrifice profits to satisfy their personal aims. 
Those that nevertheless do these things are more likely to be replaced. See, Fox, FINANCE AND 
INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE, in A DYNAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND 
POLICY 84-91 (1987) (hereinafter Fox, Finance and Industrial Performance). 
50 Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2548-50 (1997). 
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society’s scarce savings in the contemplated project. As a result, these savings are 
allocated more efficiently, going more consistently to the most promising 
proposed projects in the economy.51 Also needed for a vital new offering market 
is effective limits on the private benefits of control – i.e., good corporate law. 
Primary offerings take on even more importance than I have suggested so 
far, however, because of the intimate relationship between an effective venture 
capital market for funding innovative investment projects and initial public 
offerings (IPOs). Start-ups typically receive their initial financing from a venture 
capitalist, not from a public offering of shares. Gilson and Black, as discussed 
earlier, have proposed, however, the provocative thesis that the optimal contract is 
structured around the availability of the venture capitalist’s exit through aninitial 
publicoffering (IPO).52 Price accuracy in the venture capital exit IPO market is 
especially important. For venture capitalists, the prospect that the best ventures ex 
post will be identified accurately at time of the venture capitalist’s exit adds to the 
incentive ex ante to find the best investment project ideas to fund. Accurate 
pricing of venture exits also gives more resources for reinvestment in new 
projects to those venture capitalists who have proved their skills by having chosen 
good investment projects in the past. 
VI. CRUDE EMPIRICISM 
The theoretical story told here is that in an economy where equity markets and 
their prices play a substantial role, the finance process – the system that links 
savers to real investment – is more hospitable to investment in productivity-
promoting innovative investment. In an era of rapid scientific advance, such a 
finance system, the theory suggests, will lead to greater improvements in 
economic welfare. We will examine four moments in economic history: the 
United States in the 1970s and 1980s, Japan since 1995, continental Europe since 
the 1995, and the United States since the 1995, to see if this story seems to have 
some empirical reality.  
  
  
                                                          
51 Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor 
Empowerment, 85 VA L. REV. 1335, 1358-63 (1999). 
52 Bernard S, Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: 
Banks versus Stock Market, 47 J.FIN.ECON. 243 (1996). 
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b. Average annual compound rate. This rate is derived from a simple average of the compound 
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c. Average annual compound rate. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Supplementary Tables: 
International Comparisons of Manufacturing productivity and unit labor cost trends 17 countries 
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d. Average annual compound rate. This rate is derived from a simple average of the average 
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Economic Outlook Database, 2008. 
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A. Evidence of Innovation-Based Productivity Gains 
Table 1 reveals that, of the four moments in economic history under examination, 
the United States since the mid-1990s is the one with the greatest growth in GDP 
per hour worked and manufacturing output per hour worked. These differences, if 
continued over time, are important in terms of long run economic welfare. At the 
U.S. 2.1% growth rate, GDP per hour worked doubles in 33 years, whereas at the 
1.3% average rate of the major continental European economies, it will go up by 
only about half.    
Table 1 also suggests that these productivity gains are the result of 
innovation, not capital deepening. Of the four moments in economic history under 
examination, the one with the least capital deepening is the United States since the 
mid-1990s. Particularly striking is the contrast with Japan, which has been 
pouring a third more of its GDP every year – a full extra 7% of GDP every year 
that would otherwise be available for current consumption – into real investment, 
but obtaining lower gains in productivity growth per hour worked than the United 
States in the post-1995 era. 
B. Differences in the Role of Equity Markets  
The United States since the mid-1990s is also distinctive in another regard: equity 
markets and their prices have played a larger role in the process by which 
proposed investment projects are chosen than they have in the other three 
moments in economic history under examination.  
1. The United States since 1995 versus the United States 1970-1990 
The finance process in the United States went through significant transition 
starting in the mid-1980s, whereby external equity markets and their prices began 
to play a larger role.  
  a. Focus on share value maximization. Compared to earlier time 
periods, the focus in the United States in recent years has been much more on 
share value maximization as the primary goal of established, publicly traded 
corporations.53 This change in focus was supported by a number of institutional 
                                                          
53 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1466 (2007) (tracing the history of 
this change in focus to shareholder value). Benght Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate 
Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 121 (2001) (documenting a move toward a more market-oriented style of corporate 
governance in the United States). 
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changes: a more active market for corporate control, boards that are increasingly 
independent of operating management, and share-price based compensation.  
The stage opened for this change in focus with the sharp increase in the 
number and size of hostile takeovers in the second half of the 1980s.54 Many of 
these offers involved substantial leverage and many other firms, in an effort to 
avoid becoming targets themselves, restructured on their own to become more 
leveraged.55 Overall, the result was a payout to the market of a larger portion of 
established firms’ cash flows.  
The number of hostile takeover bids subsided by the early 1990s but the 
surge in the late 1980s left a number of effects in its wake. These effects 
continued to drive the new focus on share value maximization. One effect was 
simply to elevate consciousness about the importance of shareholders and the 
usefulness of measuring their well-being in terms of the share price, an elevated 
consciousness that seems to have persisted. A second effect of the late 1980s 
surge was that it proved to all incumbent managers that hostile takeovers can 
really happen: one quarter of all major firms in the United States were the target 
of a hostile bid in the 1980s.56 With this reminder of an always looming threat of 
takeover, fewer incumbent management teams were likely to deviate substantially 
from making share value maximizing decisions. The drop in hostile offers in the 
1990s thus may actually have been a sign of the power of this threat: there were 
fewer hostile offers because there may have been less need for them.  
A third effect of the hostile takeover surge in late 1980s – a legislative and 
judicial backlash that permitted incumbent managers to engage in increasingly 
effective takeover defenses – would, at first glance, appear to have worked in the 
opposite direction, providing a shield for non-share-value-maximizing managers. 
But, ironically, the opposite seems to be the case. The availability of these 
defenses tended to be contingent upon the firm having a more genuinely 
independent, monitoring board of directors.57 The movement toward more 
independent monitoring boards was spurred as well by the increasing portion of 
                                                          
54 G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 60 J.FIN. 2599, 2611 
(2000).  Schwert shows the level of offers labeled as “hostile” to be higher in every year from 
1985-1989 than it was in any year before in the survey, which goes back to 1975. The author 
cautions that offers are often characterized as hostile because the target management is engaging 
in strategic bargaining to get a better price, rather than just to protect their incumbency. The 
opposite occurs often, as well, where a board invites, or at least decides not to resist, what is 
labeled a “friendly” bid in order to gently remove incumbent management. See also John C. 
Coates, IV & Reinier Kraakman, CEO Tenure, Performance and Turnover in S&P 500 
Companies, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=925532
55 Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 53, at 124. 
56 Mark L. Mitchel & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and 
Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 199 (1996). 
57 Gordon, supra note 53, at 1522-23. 
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shares held by corporate-governance-concerned institutional investors. These 
more independent boards in turn acted in a number of ways that spurred share 
value maximizing managerial behavior. To start, because of their greater 
independence and their raised consciousness concerning shareholder welfare, 
these boards became more effective monitors of share value maximizing behavior 
on the part of established firm managers. There has been, for example, an increase 
in the rate of turnover of CEOs and an increased relationship between turnover 
and share price performance.58 Also, these boards were more prone to accept, and 
even prompt, offers that would result in the replacement of incumbent 
management where they believed the offered price was superior to the value that 
incumbent management could deliver. As a result, many apparently friendly 
offers were really motivated by aboard recognition of the need for control 
change,59 a trend that was further accentuated by lessened incumbent management 
resistance due to the increasing use of golden parachutes.60 Finally, these boards 
brought in additional market discipline through the steep increase in the use of 
share-price based compensation.61  
  b. IPOs. IPO figures tend to swing rather sharply from one year to 
the next and are very sensitive to overall economic conditions. Nevertheless, 
longer term data concerning initial public offerings also show a break, starting in 
the second half of the 1980s and solidifying in the 1990s and the first half of the 
2000s, that demonstrates that IP0s have taken on significantly greater importance 
in the economy, at least until the recent great recession and financial crisis.  
In the 1970s, total proceeds from IPOs per year averaged about .04% of 
U.S. GDP and in no year were greater than .24% of GDP.62 The number of IPOs 
                                                          
58 Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly 
Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOs, NBER Working Paper (2006), 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=924751 (turnover in the period 
1992-2005 period was more rapid than shown in studies of earlier periods and more related to 
share price performance); Mark R. Huson et al., Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO 
Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective, 56 J. FIN. 2265, 2295 tbl. VII (2001) (CEO firings were 
accompanied by a 4.00% positive market-adjusted share price reaction in the 1989-1994 period, as 
compared to a 1.75% positive reaction in the 1983-1988 period, suggesting that firing decisions 
were more attuned to market preferences in the latter period). 
59 Coates & Kraakman, supra note 54. 
60 Gordon, supra note 53, at 1533-34. 
61 Between 1992 and 2000, for the average S&P 500 firm CEO, the value of his or her stock 
options at the day of grant, as measured by a Black Scholes type formula, increased from being 
27% of total compensation to 51% of total compensation. Kevin Murphy, Explaining Executive 
Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
847, 848 fig. 1 (2002). 
62 The IPO proceeds as a percentage of GDP figures in this section are calculated on the basis of 
figures for the amount of proceeds from IPOs for each year from Jay R. Ritter, Some factoids 
about the 2009 IPO market. Available at 
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averaged 154 per year, with the annual number varying from a high of 562 to a 
low of 9.63  
In the 1980s, total proceeds from IPOs per year averaged about .12% of 
U.S. GDP, and in the highest year was .32% of GDP. During the decade, the 
number of IPOs averaged 329 per year, with the annual number varying from a 
high of 524 to a low of 75.  
In the 1990s, total proceeds from IPOs per year averaged about .40% of 
U.S. GDP, about ten times the 1970s level and more than three times the 1980s 
level, and in the highest year were .71% of GDP.  During the decade, the number 
of IPOs averaged 421 per year, with the annual number varying from a high of 
688 to a low of 115.  
In the first eight years of the 2000s, total proceeds from IPOs per year also 
averaged about .30% of U.S. GDP, somewhat lower than in the 1990s, but almost 
triple the 1980s and eight times the 1970s. The number of IPOs dropped to an 
average number of 220. 
  c. Venture capital. The role of venture capital in the U.S. economy 
steadily increased in the two decades between 1980 and 2000. The number of 
venture funds under management in the United States, under a broad definition 
that would include funds available for financing non-high-tech start up 
companies, increased from .2% to .3% of GDP in the first half of the 1980s to .5% 
to .6% of GDP in the second half of the 1980s and first half of the 1990s.64 It then 
shot up shot up at a rapid rate during the tech bubble period of the second half of 
the 1990s reaching 1.6% by 1999. In the period from 2000 to 2007 venture capital 
funds under management as a percentage of GDP had a high 2.4% in 2001 and a 
low of 1.8% in 2007 with the other years ranging from 2.1% to 2.3%, ten times 
the figure in the early years of the 1980s. 
Another way of cutting at the role of venture capital in the U.S. economy 
is the percentage of GDP per year invested in real investment projects by venture 
capital funds. Because of shifts in both supply and demand, this figure can vary 
widely from one year to the next,65 but again the longer term trend is toward a 
much larger role for venture investment in the 1990s and 2000s compared to 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2009Factoids.pdf. The GDP for each year from GDP for 
each year from World Bank World Development Indications (also used for all other U.S. GDP 
ratios in this Part VI, available at http://www.google.com/publicdata?ds=wb-
wdi&met=ny_gdp_mktp_cd&idim=country:JPN&dl=en&hl=en&q=japan+gdp+statistics#met=ny
_gdp_mktp_cd&idim=country:USA. 
63 Id. The number of IPOs for each year in this section are from Ritter, supra note 62. 
64 The venture capital under management as a percentage of GDP figures in this section are 
calculated on the basis of figures for the amount of venture capital under management for each 
year from NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, YEARBOOK 2008 at 1, figure 1.02. 
65 Josh Lerner, Panacea or Mirage? Venture Capital and Innovation (2008) available at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/contracteconomics/conferences/buslawinnovation08.htm. 
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earlier. The figure for 1980 was .02% of GDP and the average for the first half of 
the 1980s was .05% of GDP.66 During the second half of the 1980s and the first 
half of the 1990s, venture capital investments averaged about .06% of GDP. It 
soared during the tech bubble period, rising from .11% of GDP in 1996 to 1.06% 
in 2000. It then settled back, and, from 2002 to 2007, was relatively steady 
averaging about .20% of GDP, four times the level of 1980-1984 and more than 
three times the level from 1985-1994. In 2007, 85% of these funds went to firms 
in high technology industries.67 
  d. Turnover of large firms. Another measure of the role of capital 
markets in an economy, though indirect, is the rate of turnover of established 
firms. This is because the extent to which the cash flow generated by firms with 
less promising investment opportunities becomes available to fund real 
investment by firms with more promising opportunities depends on the extent to 
which managers of established firms are under pressure to maximize share value 
and on the existence of efficient and effective channels to transfer funds outside 
firm boundaries. The rate of established firm turnover has accelerated 
considerably in the United States in recent years. Of the firms listed in the Fortune 
500 in 1960, one third had been replaced by 1980, a turnover rate of about 2% per 
year.68 It only took four years for one third of the firms listed in the Fortune 500 
in 1998 to be replaced, a turnover rate of almost 10% per year.69  
  e. Measures of share price accuracy. There is likely to be a 
positive relationship between share price accuracy and the importance of equity 
markets in an economy. The directions of causation are likely to run both ways. 
Going one way, unless share prices are relatively good predictors of future cash 
flows relative to the available alternatives, an economy that depends on equity 
prices as an important guide of economic activity is not likely to do well and so 
such reliance is unlikely to persist for very long. Going the other way, if an 
economy depends on equity prices as an important guide of economic activity, 
there will be significant market pressure on issuers, and public pressure on 
government, to assure a relatively high level of corporate transparency, which is 
impounded in price and leads to greater price accuracy.  
One measure of share price accuracy in increasing use is R2, in essence the 
portion of firm level variation in share returns that can be explained by market-
wide factors using the standard market model. R2 appears to be a good inverse 
proxy for how much fundamental information concerning future shareholder 
                                                          
66 The percentage of GDP that represents real investment funded by venture capital in this section 
are calculated on the basis of figures for the amount of venture capital investment each year from 
NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, YEARBOOK 2008 at 24, fig. 3.10. 
67 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, YEARBOOK 2008 at 11. 
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distributions is impounded in price; the lower R2, the more accurate the share 
price. The theory is that a low R2 is indicative that the firm is the subject of a 
relatively rich stream of information over time that, as it comes out, moves price 
around independent of the factors that move the market as a whole, a theory that 
has considerable empirical support.70  
 The R2 for the average U.S. firm has been declining fairly steadily since 
the 1930s. Relevant for the comparisons being made here, it was about .20 in 
1970, about .10 in 1980, about .05 in 1990 and about .02 in 1995.71  
1. The United States since 1995 versus Japan since 1995 and Europe since 
1995 
Now let us compare the United States since 1995 with Japan since 1995 and with 
continental Europe since 1995 based on the same factors that we used to compare 
the role of external equity markets and their prices in the United States 1970-1990 
with their role in United States since 1995. It becomes clear that equity markets 
and their prices play a larger role in the United States than in the other two 
economies. 
  a. Focus on share value maximization. As discussed above, the 
catalyst for the much greater focus on share value maximization in the United 
States was the wave of hostile takeovers in the second half of the 1980s. 
Continental Europe and Japan have never had a comparable experience. While 
there have been changes in recent years that have reduced the security of 
incumbent managers in both these economies, in neither economy has there been 
a market for corporate control like the control market in the United States that, 
combined with the changes in U.S. boards since the 1990s, works in a way that 
poses as effective a threat for European and Japanese non-share-value-
maximizing managers as is faced by such U.S. managers.72 Share value 
                                                          
70 The seminal article is Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why do 
Emerging Markets have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215 (2000). See 
Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung & Artyom Durnev, Law, Share Price Accuracy, 
and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 357-366 (2003) for a 
more detailed discussion of the theory and a review of the confirmatory empirical studies. 
71 Morck et al., supra note 70 at 222, figure 3, 223, table 2. 
72 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American Perspective on the New German Anti-Takeover Law, 
Die Aktiengesellschaft, vol. 12, at 4 (Dec. 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=336420; 
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Institutional Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity Through 
Deals, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A 
NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS (Curtis J. Milhaupt, ed. 2001); Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Lost 
Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why, 
Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper (2003); Curtis J. 
Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware: The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2171 (2005). 
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maximization is not the clearly stated goal of the board and other participants in 
corporate governance in firms in continental Europe and Japan.73 There is also 
considerably less use of share price-based executive compensation.74 
b. Level of IPOs. IPOs were almost unheard of in Japan in the 
1970s and 1980s but became an established form of financing starting in the 
1990s. Still, relative to the United States, they play a smaller role in the economy. 
From 2000through 2007, proceeds from IPOs represented a yearly average of 
about .2% of GDP in Japan75 compared to about .3% in the United States. The 
continental European countries tell a different story. For those eight years, 
proceeds from IPOs as a percentage of GDP represented a yearly average for 
France, Germany and Italy, respectively, of .68%, .61% and .57%. These figures, 
however, are greatly inflated by the first three years of the decade, where there 
appear to have been some very large, established private corporations that went 
public. The respective figures for the five years 2003-2007 are .30%, .18% and 
.39%.    
  c. Venture capital. Comparing the importance of high tech venture 
capital in different economies is tricky because of differences in definitions and 
institutions. A rough picture emerges, however.  
In the Eurozone, total private equity invested as a percentage of GDP for 
the six years running from 2002 to 2007 inclusive averaged about .12% per 
                                                          
73 See REINIER KRAAKMAN et al., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW (2009 2d ed.) for a 
comprehensive discussion of the similarities and differences among these different systems in 
solving the basic problems of governing large businesses organized in the corporate form. See also 
citations in note 72 supra and note infra. 
74 Gordon, supra note 72. The importance of outside finance for project choice in an economy has 
been recognized for a long time, and has continued to be a focus of research. See, e.g. JOSHPH A. 
SCHUMPTER, THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1911); JOHH R. HICKS, A THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC HISTORY 143-145 (1969) (emphasizing the liquidity provided by financial markets as 
critical to early industrial development in England, France and Holland); Raghuram G. Rajan & 
Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV.. 559 (1998) (cross 
country study showing relationship between financial market development and rate of growth of 
firms relying on external finance and relationship of such development and flourishing of smaller 
high technology firms); Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence, in HANDBOOK 
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (2005). For a skeptical view, see JOAN ROBINSON, THE RATE OF INTEREST 
AND OTHER ESSAYS (1952) (finance follows industry). 
75 The IPO proceeds as a percentage of GDP figures in this section for Japan, France, Germany 
and Italy are calculated on the basis of figures for the amount of proceeds from IPOs for each year 
from Thompson Financial Securities Data and the GDP for each year from World Bank World 
Development Indications, available at http://www.google.com/publicdata?ds=wb-
wdi&met=ny_gdp_mktp_cd&idim=country:JPN&dl=en&hl=en&q=japan+gdp+statistics. 
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year.76 Private equity, however, includes buyouts and equity financing for 
established private companies. About 30% of private equity appears to be for 
seed, start-up and expansion purposes, what in the United States would be 
considered venture capital.77 Thus, about .04% of GDP during these years went to 
venture investments in continental Europe, compared to .20% for the United 
States, about five times as much. The same basic story is told by figures from 
other sources, using perhaps somewhat different definitions, for the period 2000-
2003. These figures suggest that venture capital investments for venture capital 
were .10%, .09% and .08% of GDP for France, Germany and Italy respectively.78 
This compares to a figure from the same source of .38% for the United States, 
about four times as great. Moreover, about 75% of the U.S. venture capital 
investment during this period went to firms in high technology sectors, whereas 
only 35-40% did in France, Germany and Italy.79 
Venture capital investment in high technology firms is even less important 
in the Japanese economy. For the period 2000-2003, it was about .02% of GDP, 
with the U.S. figure for the period being .40%, about twenty times as great.80 
Moreover, only about 35% of the Japanese venture capital investment that did 
occur during this period went to firms in high technology sectors, compared again 
to the U.S. figure of 75%.81  
  d. Turnover of large firms. The turnover rate in the United States is 
considerably higher than in Europe. Eight of the 25 largest firms in the United 
States in 2003 did not exist or were very small in 1960. All of the largest firms in 
Europe in 1998 were already large in 1960.82 
  e. Share price accuracy. As discussed above, R2, the portion of 
firm level variation in share returns that can be explained by market-wide factors 
                                                          
76 This figure is calculated on the basis of figures for European Private Equity Capital Investments 
by Year in National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 2008 (prepared by Thompson) at 98, 
figure 14. The Eurozone GDP figures come from Eurostat Yearbook 2010 at 98, Table 1.2. 
77 Id. at 99, figure 16. 
78 OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY SCOREBOARD 2005, 43. Data from yet another 
source for the period 1999-2002 suggests approximately the same difference in the importance of 
venture investments between the major continental European economies and the United States. 
These figures show that venture capital investment in high-technology sectors as a percentage of 
GDP are .12%, .08% and .06% for France, Germany and Italy respectively, with the comparable 
figure for the United States being .40%. OECD, VENTURE CAPITAL: TRENDS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 9, Figure 2 (2003). 
79 OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY SCOREBOARD 2005, 42-43. 
80 OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY SCOREBOARD 2005, 43. The figures for 1999-
2002 are comparable. OECD, VENTURE CAPITAL: TRENDS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 9, 
Figure 2 (2003). 
81 OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY SCOREBOARD 2005, at 43. 
82 Commission of the European Community, Green Paper: Entrepreneurship in Europe at 8 
(2003). 
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using the standard market model, appears to be a good inverse proxy for how 
much fundamental information concerning future shareholder distributions is 
impounded in price. The R2 for the average French firm in 1995 was .075, in 
Germany, .114, in Italy, .183, and in Japan, .234.83 These figures compare with 
.021 in the United States, suggesting that U.S. share prices were significantly 
more accurate.84 
C. Conclusions 
The data discussed above clearly shows that the United States has enjoyed a 
significantly greater increase in innovation induced productivity than have the 
economies in the other three moments of economic history under examination. In 
combination, the data discussed above, when considered as a whole, also tells a 
convincing story that equity markets and their prices have played a larger role in 
the process by which investment projects are chosen in the United States since 
1995 than in the United States between 1970 and 1990. The same can be said for 
the comparison of the United States since 1995 and continental Europe and Japan 
since 1995. This data provides strong support for the statement of Baumol, Litan 
and Schram: “Only in the United States, at least so far, is [the] task of 
transmission of financial resources from savers to producers carried on primarily 
in organized markets, such as stock and bond markets, rather than by banks.”85 
Is there a connection between this larger role for equity markets and their 
prices and the greater innovation induced rate of productivity gains that have been 
observed in the United States since 1995? This is of course much harder to prove. 
Many other things change over time and many other differences exist between 
economies that can contribute to differences in the rate of productivity gains. 
Such other factors include the regulation and structure of labor markets, taxes, the 
size of a market in which there are truly no restrictions on the movement of 
goods, services and factors of production, and even possibly societal attitudes 
toward risk. Nevertheless, the results of this exercise in crude empiricism are 
completely consistent with the theoretical story told in this paper.  
  
  
                                                          
83 Morck et al., supra note 70, at 222, figure 3, 223, table 2. 
84 Id. 
85 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ROBERT E. LITAN, & CARL SCHRAMM, GOOD CAPITALISM, BAD 
CAPITALISM, AND THE ECONOMICS OF GROWTH AND PROSPERITY (2007). 
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VII. CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW 
We live in an era in which the rate of scientific discovery creates the potential for 
rapid improvements in productivity through technical change. This potential is 
more likely to be realized, I have argued, in an economy with three key 
characteristics: deep, vibrant equity markets, the practical availability of the 
dispersed pattern of shareholdings as a form of corporate ownership for 
entrepreneurs who deem this pattern of ownership to be desirable, and managers 
of established firms who are deterred from over-retaining cash flow and who are 
otherwise challenged to find good projects and maximize share value. 
A. Looking at the “Market Centered” versus “Bank Centered” Corporate 
Governance Debate in a New Light 
While the terms “market centered” and “bank centered” systems of corporate 
governance oversimplify the range of corporate finance and governance systems 
available to an economy and the ways these systems can differ, forcing, as they 
do, any given economy into one of just two categories, the ideal argued for here 
clearly falls into the general “market centered” category. There continues to be an 
intense debate over which of these two general categories of systems is the more 
desirable, with commentators often dividing along national lines. This paper does 
not attempt to resolve the debate as it has been traditionally conducted, where the 
arguing points for each side, properly categorized, relate largely to static 
economic efficiency.86 This paper argues that the system of corporate finance and 
                                                          
86 For a discussion of the relationship between strong securities markets and economic growth, see 
Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 
688 (1997)(collecting studies); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for 
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 832—34, 835—38 (2001) (same). For 
empirical evidence that the direction of causation leads from financial development generally 
(both in the form of a banking sector and of stock markets) to economic growth and not the other 
way around, see Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 
AM. ECON. REV. 559–86 (1998). For further discussion of the advantages of dispersed ownership, 
see Erik Berglof & Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Enforcement 3, 12, 47, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=625286. 
A number of static efficiency arguments in favor of deep, vibrant equity markets and 
dispersed ownership are suggested by this literature. By making it easier for issuers to raise funds 
and investors to invest, economies with these features facilitate the transfer of funds from stable or 
declining firms, which have substantial cash flows but few promising new investment projects, to 
growing, often new, firms, which have less cash flow but many promising investment projects. By 
making diversification easier, dispersed ownership promotes the more efficient allocation of risk. 
The liquidity that deep, vibrant markets provide both lowers the cost of capital for issuers and 
increases investor utility. Share prices in such markets also more efficiently impound information 
held by diverse persons that is relevant to predicting an issuer’s future cash flows and in so doing 
help managers to make decisions based on more accurate cash flow projections. Management can 
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governance advocated here has the different, less appreciated virtue of better 
promoting dynamic efficiency. The resulting welfare gains are likely to swamp 
the advantages of whichever side of the debate is right in terms of static 
efficiency. 
B. Promoting Vibrant, Deep Equity Markets and Making Dispersed Ownership 
Practically Available 
Because the “market centered” system already has its many adherents based on 
their perceptions of its static efficiency advantages, considerable attention has 
been paid to the legal arrangements that promote its development. To start, 
vibrant, deep equity markets and dispersed ownership structures appear to be 
impossible without a high level of corporate transparency.87 This disclosure will 
                                                                                                                                                              
be disciplined in such a system by low barriers to hostile takeover and a high level of 
transparency. 
One argument in favor of a “bank centered” system, and for less concern with facilitating 
dispersed shareholding, is that the bank or the dominant shareholder is a much more effective 
monitor of the manager than is possible is a dispersed system.  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of 
Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and State in the Separation of Ownership and Control,
111 YALE L..J. 1, 16—17 (2001). Another argument in favor of the bank-centered system arises 
out of a disagreement that share value maximization is socially desirable. This disagreement 
represents skepticism that the prices of a firm’s inputs and outputs are sufficiently close to their 
social costs and benefits that the firm’s cash flow is a reasonable measure of its contribution to 
society. This skepticism, combined with a belief that management can be motivated, if freed of the 
need to maximize share value, to make decisions that better reflect the true social costs and 
benefits of the firm’s activities. Adherents of a bank centered model believe that in such a system 
managers can be freed of the need to maximize share value and motivated to take account of the 
true social costs and benefits their firms’ activities. Michael Gruson & Wienand Meilicke, The 
New Co-Determination Law in Germany, 32 BUS. LAW. 571 (1977); Detlev F.Vagts, Reforming 
the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 38—43 (1966). 
87 Black, supra note 86, at 783, 834—35 (collecting empirical studies showing relationship 
between transparency and depth of equity markets measured by indicators such as the ratio of 
stock market capitalization to GDP); Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of 
Securities Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L REV. 333, 376—87 (same); Hazem Daouk et al., Capital 
Market Governance: How Do Security Laws Affect Market Performance 25, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=702682 (study linking transparency to cost of 
capital and liquidity); Eirk Berglof & A. Pajuste, Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern 
Europe, in GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (P. Cornelius & B. Kogut 
eds., 2003) (how countries markets in transition countries with poor transparency were quickly 
transformed, after initial privatization auctions created dispersed ownership, to concentrated 
ownership economies); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 109 (2006) (dispersed ownership and the separation of ownership from control not 
possible without reliable, audited financial statements), John C. Coffee, Privatization and 
Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE LESSONS FROM TRANSITION ECONOMY REFORMS 274-281(M. Fox & M. Heller eds, 
2006) (comparing the disappearance of market trading for most of the nearly 1500 Czech issuers 
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be under-produced without a system of mandatory disclosure rules, because issuer 
disclosure’s social costs are less than the private costs to the issuer and its social 
benefits are greater than the private benefits to the issuer.88 Such rules are not 
meaningful unless they are effectively and fairly enforced by governmental 
authorities and/or private litigation.89 
Vibrant, deep equity markets and dispersed ownership structures are also 
not possible without some kind of restraint on management and powerful 
shareholders that prevents them from directing to themselves non-pro-rata 
division corporate cash flows or assets. Such a restraint is a fundamental feature 
of good corporate governance.90 It is needed because concerns about such non-
pro-rata divisions make potential non-controlling investors unwilling to pay a 
sufficiently high price for newly offered shares to make the offering worthwhile 
for the issuer.91 This restraint will come from corporate law rules prohibiting such 
non-pro-rata divisions, again effectively enforced by public authorities or private 
litigation. Because enforcement requires awareness, corporate transparency is a 
precondition for such effective enforcement.92  
                                                                                                                                                              
created by the privatization in the early 1990s with the better performance of the Polish capital 
markets and attributing the difference in part to very poor issuer disclosure in the Czech Republic 
with relatively high quality issuer disclosure in Poland). 
88 The disadvantages to an issuer from its competitors, major suppliers and major customers 
obtaining from the issuer’s disclosures information that helps them compete or deal more 
effectively with the issuer are private costs to the issuer, but not costs to society since the other 
parties enjoy commensurate gains. As for the divergence of social and private benefits, one 
issuer’s disclosure helps the market better predict the future cash flows of other issuers, which 
produces social benefits in terms of reducing the agency costs of management of these other firms 
and improving the allocation of capital. These social benefits cannot be captured by the disclosing 
firm and thus are not private benefits. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why 
Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA L. REV. 1335 (1999). 
89 John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 229 
(2007); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works In Securities 
Laws? 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) (empirical study finding a relationship between the availability of 
private enforcement of securities laws and capital market development), Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil 
Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 297 
(deterrence rationales for civil damage actions). 
90 Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from Russian Enterprise 
Fiascoes, 75 NYU L. REV. 1720, 1723-27, 1740-45, 1770-71 (2000). 
91 Id. at 1725. 
92 See, e.g., OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s 
Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2002) (corporate law is ineffective without transparency). While 
transparency is a precondition for effective enforcement of corporate law rules against such non-
pro-rata divisions, it might be sufficient by itself if combined with the absence of majority 
shareholder and low barriers to a hostile takeover. 
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C. Preventing Over-retention of Internal Funds by Established Firms 
Finally, disciplining management of established firms in a dispersed shareholder 
system depends on a securities and corporate law that poses low barriers to hostile 
takeover and that permits appropriately designed share-price based compensation. 
Again, the increased transparency that comes from effective mandatory disclosure 
assists in the operation of both these devices to prevent managers from over-
retaining earnings and to encourage them more generally to maximize share 
value.93   
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The pivotal role of innovation in increasing productivity is well established. Most 
innovation requires new real investment. A high rate of improvement in economic 
welfare therefore requires that the process in an economy that allocates society’s 
scarce savings among proposed real investment projects be sensitive to the 
prospects promising new innovation. This Article’s ultimate goal is to begin to 
consider how corporate and securities law, which help structure important 
elements of this process, can be designed to promote such sensitivity. 
In service of this ultimate goal, the article sketches out an unconventional 
approach to thinking about the functioning of this process in a market economy. 
This approach is based on a seemingly paradoxical analogy of the finance process 
to the way a hierarchical organization, when making decisions, gathers and 
processes relevant bits of information dispersed among many individuals. Using 
this analogy, the approach takes advantage of important thinking in 
communications and organizational theory about how organizations can be 
structured to be sensitive to the potentialities of new information and ideas.  
The core of the analogy of a market economy’s finance process to a 
hierarchical organization is the observation that ultimate decision makers in the 
process – savers – lack most of the disparately held information needed to assess 
and compare each proposed investment project in the economy and that they solve 
this problem by a combination of advice seeking and decision delegation. The 
usual view is that markets and hierarchical organizations are sharply distinct 
substitutes for each other. This usual view arises from a focus on the allocation of 
resources for current production and consumption. Here, as Hayek so persuasively 
argued, using the market enormously lowers the cost of information handling.  
Each consumer needs only to look inside herself to her prior experience with the 
goods she consumes and to her utility function, and each producer to its 
production function. Prices incorporate all the rest of the information needed to 
                                                          
93 Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 258-59 
(2009). 
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coordinate their actions into a societal decision as to what quantities of each good 
to produce, what combination of inputs to use in producing each, to whom the 
output of each good is allocated.  
In contrast, an investment opportunity – the potential for transforming 
resources today into goods for consumption tomorrow based on a given idea – is 
perfectly elastic in supply and is thus not competitively priced. The cost of the 
investment is the cost of the real resources needed to implement it. Individual 
savers need to look outside themselves for information on the idea’s prospects. 
They thus bear some resemblance to heads of hierarchical organizations. They 
seek advice and use decision delegation to deal with their information 
deficiencies, but, by their choices concerning from whom to seek advice and to 
whom to delegate, their decisions determine the structure of the whole system.  
If we judge the finance process as an organization seeking to make 
decisions allocating society’s scarce savings to the most promising investment 
project proposals, we can use three criteria. Is the system’s best evaluation of a 
proposal’s prospects being heeded? Is information concerning each proposal 
being sent to the persons most capable of evaluating its prospects? And is the 
system achieving these first two goals in a cost effective fashion in terms of the 
real resources the system itself consumes.  
With these criteria in mind, consider two possible market economy 
finance systems. The first system is relatively closed. Project implementation is 
dominated by established firms using either internal funds or funds from banks 
with which the firms have strong, established relationships. The managers of 
these established firms are largely protected from removal by a vote of 
disinterested directors or of dissatisfied shareholders or by a hostile takeover. The 
second system is more open. A larger share of project implementation is 
undertaken by relatively new firms. Established firms pay out a greater portion of 
their cash flow and for external finance rely more on capital markets and less on 
banks with which they have established relationships. The incumbent managers of 
the established firms in this more open economy are more vulnerable to removal 
in reaction to a poor performance, evaluated in part by the medium term share 
price performance of their firms.  
The closed system is ideal in a world of slow change, where the rate of 
scientific discovery translatable into new products and processes is low. First, the 
system is likely to implement the projects that its best evaluations suggest have 
the best prospects. New project proposals in a world of slow change will not be 
very different from the projects that have already been implemented. They will 
typically involve the replacement of, or an addition to, a similar project already 
existing in the economy. The proposal for such a project is most likely to come 
from an employee of the firm operating the existing project. A firm that operates 
in a market with a gradually increasing demand or which has a superior record of 
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figuring out minor product or process improvements will have a list of projects 
which are superior to those of a firm with the opposite characteristics. It will also 
be more profitable. Thus the most funds automatically go to the evaluators who 
are being presented the most promising projects to evaluate. Second, the 
information concerning each proposal is likely to be sent to the persons in the 
economy most capable of evaluating its prospects. In a closed system, the 
information relevant to evaluating the prospects of a proposed project goes to only 
a few people: the top managers of the firm for which the proponent is an 
employee or the bankers with which the firm has a close relationship. These are 
the people best able to use this information, however. Because of their familiarity 
with the firms’ existing projects and the economic environment within which 
these projects operate, they will have an inherent advantage over outsiders in 
evaluating the similar project that is being proposed. Finally, the system achieves 
these first two goals in a cost effective fashion because an information and 
decision system uses less real resources when it relies primarily on 
communication among persons who are already familiar with each other and with 
the situation being appraised.  
The closed system is not ideal in a world of fast change, where the rate of 
scientific discovery translatable into new products and processes is high, as would 
appear to be the case currently. The system is not likely consistently to implement 
the projects that its best evaluations suggest have the best prospects because 
proponents of the most promising projects are not necessarily employees of the 
firms with the most internal cash flows. And the information concerning each 
proposal is often not sent to the persons in the economy most capable of 
evaluating its prospects because the top managers of a proponent’s employer may 
not be the persons most capable of judging the project’s potential.  In essence, the 
low operating costs of a closed system are likely to be a false economy.  
The analogy of the finance process to a hierarchical organization is useful 
in understanding what is going on here. An organization is sensitive to new ideas 
useful for making better decisions when it has the ability to rearrange items of 
information in new patterns and identify the occasions when a particular 
rearrangement would be useful. For the system to be able to allow new ideas 
through, the symbols must aggregate less information. Multiple evaluators are 
needed because people vary in what they would be sensitive to. People making 
decisions should not be narrow experts. There should not be too much autonomy 
in the sense of decisions being chopped up with each participant having a clearly 
defined zone of authority with respect to her little part, because people learn from 
each other in collaborative decision-making. Some uncertainty in the environment 
is good: stress leads to the questioning of old truths. All of this requires more real 
resources: there is a tradeoff between a system’s cost of information handling and 
its sensitivity to useful new ideas. 
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This analysis suggests something about what the structure of a finance 
process most sensitive to promising innovative new investment project proposals 
would look like. The incumbent managers of established firms should be under 
some threat of replacement, judged in part, at least in the medium run, by the 
share price performance of their firms. Established firms should pay out a 
relatively high portion of their cash flows back out into the market. There should 
be a substantial venture capital sector and an active market for IPOs. For the 
equity markets to play the role contemplated here properly, primary and 
secondary market prices should be relatively accurate, which requires, among 
other things, a high level of issuer transparency. 
This story tends to be supported by the crude empiricism presented here 
with respect to the four moments in economic history: the United States in the 
1970s and 1980s, Japan since 1995, continental Europe since the 1995, and the 
United States since 1995. The United States since 1995, relative to the other three 
moments in economic history, has had the least capital deepening and the fastest 
rate of growth in productivity per hour worked. It has also had, relative to the 
other three moments, a finance system most closely resembling what is called for 
here. 
Reaching the best point in the tradeoff between sensitivity to promising 
innovative investment project proposals and the cost of system operation is not 
automatic. Specifically, and most important to the discussion here, the legal 
system is one of the factors that determines a particular economy’s point on this 
tradeoff. In addition, there is probably some path dependency in the sense that an 
economy’s historical experience tends to be self reinforcing, whereby each part of 
the system is most rewarded when its behavior fits with the other parts of the 
system. Also, while the supply of innovative project proposals has been treated so 
far as exogenous, undoubtedly potential proponents are more likely to focus on 
generating such ideas and to bring what they generate forward if there is a better 
chance that their proposals will be implemented. Thus a more sensitive overall 
system will prompt a bigger flow of promising innovative investment project 
proposals. 
The finance system structure that I suggest is most conducive to 
innovation sounds very much like the “market centered” system as it is somewhat 
caricatured in the “market centered” verus “bank centered” debate about corporate 
governance over the last few decades. Much of this debate, though, has been 
about which system can generate a higher level of static efficiency – the optimal 
allocation of resources holding technology constant – plus, for some adherents of 
one side or the other, the implications of the choice for other values such as self 
realization through work by providing a place for self management, craft, 
professionalism or creativity, just distribution, and a sense of community and 
democratic participation among the employees of a firm. Though not totally 
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unconnected to these various concerns, the focus here is on what kind of system 
can achieve dynamic efficiency, with its potential over time for much greater 
welfare gains than can be achieved by static efficiency.  
The market versus bank centered corporate governance debate is useful to 
our task here, however, because it has prompted considerable thought about the 
necessary legal preconditions for a market centered system to develop and 
succeed. These include effectively enforced securities disclosure and anti-fraud 
laws to promote issuer transparency. Transparency leads to securities market 
liquidity and a lower cost of capital, which are needed for IPO markets to flourish 
and for capital markets to transfer savings effectively from established firms with 
a surplus of internal funds relative to their supply of good investment ideas to 
ones with a deficit of internal funds relative to such ideas. Issuer transparency also 
leads to greater share price accuracy, which in turn assists mechanisms such as the 
market for corporate control and share-price based compensation to limit 
managerial agency costs, in particular the managerial tendency to invest in 
negative NPV projects to maximize firm growth when a firm has a surplus of cash 
flow relative to its number of good investment ideas. In addition, corporate law 
must not provide incumbent management the means for too much protection 
against removal by hostile tender offer or shareholder or independent board vote, 
and it should make share-price based compensation legally practical.  Finally, 
corporate law needs to assure investors that it provides serious constraints on non-
pro-rata distribution among shareholders of the wealth created by the firm, 
because otherwise firms wishing to do IPOs will not be able to sell them at a price 
worth their issuance.  
Relating the law of publicly traded corporations to the promotion of 
innovation is a large project. The idea that a finance process of the type 
recommended can help innovation and that law plays a role is not an entirely new 
idea, but it has not been thought through very systematically. This article is a first 
step that sketches out the broad outline of a promising approach. The key message 
is that in the academic and policy discussions of corporate and securities law, 
much more attention must be paid to their effect on innovation. This can only be 
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